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in me. An extra thank you to Åsmund for patiently letting me try out ideas, paper parts





1 The impact of targeting technologies and consumer multi-homing on
digital platform competiton 11
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.4 Introducing targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.5 When is targeting profitable? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.6 Equilibrium analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.7 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2 Co-location, good, bad or both: How does new entry of discount variety
stores affect local grocery business? 46
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Data and a first look at the market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 A diff-in-diff analysis of co-location effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 Extensive- and intensive margins: How to understand co-location forces . . 75
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3
3 Size-based input price discrimination under endogenous inside options 91
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.3 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Comparison of input price discrimination and uniform pricing . . . . . . . 107
3.5 Concluding remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4
Introduction
We live in a consumer society. Countless firms are competing over our attention and wallets.
The firms’ strategic decision making is not only crucial to their survival, it also affects the
well-being of consumers. Understanding market structures and firm behavior is therefore
essential to manage firm performance and regulate the business environment. Over time,
industries change and new insight is required. The purpose of this thesis is to shed light
on current topics related to trade in digital and physical goods (wholesale and retail).
First of all, these are important industries because they occupy a considerable propor-
tion of consumers’ time and money. Consider, for instance, grocery retail. In pre-covid
times, the average Norwegian household went grocery shopping 3.4 times per week, spend-
ing more than 11 percent of its income (Alfnes et al.; 2019, Vegard; 2018). In the choice
of which store to visit, factors like store location, design, assortment and prices play an
important role. Since retail prices depend on input prices, both supplier and retail decisions
may have a big impact on consumer welfare.1
When people are not grocery shopping, it is not unlikely that they consume media
content. While many traditional media are losing ground, digital media thrive. For in-
stance, 60 percent of the Norwegian population read online newspapers on a daily basis
(Statistics Norway, 2021a). In contrast, only 24 percent read print newspapers. Although
digital media consumption may not account for the largest share of household budgets, it
is eating a remarkable number of hours. On average, Norwegians spend almost 3 hours
on digital mass media every day (Statistics Norway, 2021b). The same tendency applies
1When it comes to grocery retail, physical stores still account for the vast majority of sales (Kitch,
2019). Hence, we do not elaborate on the fact that some factors would be more important (e.g home
delivery) or less important (e.g. store location) for online stores.
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worldwide: internet users dedicate about 2.5 hours a day just to social media (Tankovska,
2021). Clearly, the behavior of digital platforms is affecting us.
All three chapters analyze firm behavior, aiming to broaden current knowledge of firms’
strategic decision making. However, each chapter concentrates on a different set of research
questions. To answer them, we use both economic theory and econometric techniques.
While the first and third chapter are purely theoretical contributions, we combine theory
with an empirical approach in the second chapter. In the following, I provide a short
summary for each of the three chapters.
The first chapter is a joint work with Atle Haugen. We analyze how recent develop-
ments in the media industry impact platform performance and market equilibria. First,
we pay attention to how digitalization facilitates consumption of several media platforms
and improves the platforms ability to target advertisements. For instance, while reading
an additional print newspaper might require a shopping trip, reading more online news
only requires a few extra clicks. Second, we consider the increased strategic importance
of first-party data due to greater privacy demand and market regulation. Limited access
to third-party data pushes the platforms to use first-party data. However, such internally
collected data provides exclusive consumer information, which might give the platforms a
competitive advantage. We derive a theoretical model where platforms exploit first-party
data to target ads. With targeting technologies, the platforms can use collected data to
learn more about their subscribers and thereby display more relevant ads. Other things
equal, this increases both advertisers’ willingness to pay and platform profits. But suppose
that the technology performs better the more data that is fed to the algorithm. Then,
targeting may increase the importance of attracting consumers and lead to fierce price
competition that harms the platforms. We show that this is indeed the outcome, unless
consumers subscribe to more than one platform (i.e multi-home). In the latter case, com-
petition over consumers is not a zero-sum game and the use of targeting technologies could
benefit both consumers and platforms. Despite outcomes being completely different, the
scenario where consumers subscribe to more than one platforms is often overlooked. Ex-
isting literature typically make the assumption that consumers only use one platform (i.e
single-home). Interestingly, we find that this may not be an equilibrium outcome. This is
an important result, because it means that existing literature might be misleading. A key
takeaway from this paper is thus that awareness regarding the implications of assuming
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single-homing or multi-homing is crucial when evaluating the impact of targeting.
The second chapter is co-written with Frode Steen and Simen A. Ulsaker. Motivated
by recent changes in the retail landscape, we analyze how the rise of discount variety retail
has changed the competition towards grocery stores.2 The trend where variety discounters
add groceries to their product range implies that grocery retailers and variety discounters
have a partly overlapping assortment.3 Hence, they compete in some product categories,
but not in others. This adds some complexity to store location choices. While there is
a trend in retail towards co-location, it is not obvious that a grocery store would benefit
from having a variety store next door. On one side, more consumers are attracted to
a location with both store types. This creates a positive demand effect. On the other
side, fiercer competition over overlapping products gives rise to a negative demand effect.
To gain more insight, we measure how entries and relocations of the Norwegian variety
discount chain Europris affect local grocery stores’ sales and traffic. Benefiting from a rich
data set including travelling distances between the stores and local grocery store activity,
we use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect. We find that store establishments
have a significant impact on local grocery stores sales and traffic. Interestingly, our results
suggest that the impact has an S-shaped relationship with the distance between the stores:
when Europris entries are sufficiently close, it attracts so many consumers to the market
that local grocery sales and traffic increase. But when the new Europris stores are too far
away to be reached from the same parking, the competitive effect is stronger and makes
the grocery stores worse off. When the distance increases even further, the entry effect
gradually approaches zero. Our findings show that existing literature, which tend to treat
local competition as a linear effect, may not tell the entire story. We also demonstrate that
the empirical outcomes can be carried over to a theoretical framework.
The third chapter is a joint work with Øystein Foros, Atle Haugen and Hans Jarle Kind.
Here we focus on price setting by dominant suppliers, aiming to shed light on why they
price discriminate and to better understand in what situations it would be a better strategy
to commit to uniform pricing. We consider a market with one supplier and two retailers,
2Discount variety retail refers to stores selling general merchandise such as pet supplies, household
essentials, electronics, furniture and toys at an affordable price. An example of this retail format is the US
dollar stores.
3Another contributing factor to the assortment overlap is that grocery retailers offer non-food items
such as household essentials, pet supplies and health care products.
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and assume that the retailers may invest in a substitute to the supplier’s product. By
doing so, the retailers can strengthen their position towards the supplier and obtain more
favorable input prices. We show that if one retailer is larger than the other, it has stronger
incentives to invest and may therefore obtain a selective rebate. This is what we refer to
as size-based input price discrimination. But suppose that the supplier instead commits
to uniform pricing. Then, the large retailer’s investment reduces its wholesale price, but
unfortunately for the large retailer and the supplier, it also reduces the wholesale price of
the smaller retailer by the same amount. First, all else equal, the supplier would be worse
off from the commitment. It would have preferred ex-post to charge a higher input price
to the smaller retailer. So, how could the supplier possibly benefit from charging both
retailers the same input price? We show that this has to do with how the commitment
affect the large retailer’s investment incentives. Since investments do not provide a price
advantage under uniform pricing, the large retailer invests less. Hence, the supplier faces
a trade-off between reducing downstream investment incentives and the ability to charge a
higher price from the smallest retailer. We find that the greater downstream competition,
the more likely that the supplier will commit to uniform pricing. This has to do with
retailers investing more the fiercer they compete, because the relative input price matters
more. To reduce the downward pressure on input price, the supplier can charge a uniform
price. We show that this can be a profitable strategy for the supplier if the competitive
pressure is sufficiently strong. It is also worth mentioning that if the supplier benefits from
uniform pricing, consumers are typically worse off, and vice versa. This insight could have
important policy implications.
This thesis does not provide answers to all the questions out there. On the bright side,
this means that there are things left for future research to explore. Let me point out some
weaknesses of current research and areas that would benefit from further investigation. In
the first chapter we do not assess whether the increased use of first-party data and targeting
technologies change the way firms collaborate with each other. More research is required to
find out if it makes firms more inclined to cooperate, for instance by forming data-sharing
alliances. Another question that deserves greater attention is to what extent consumers
actually want targeted ads. On one side, it could increase the relevance of the displayed
ads. But on the other side, it also raises privacy concerns. Currently, the literature is
inconclusive on this issue. Nonetheless, it is highly relevant from a welfare perspective.
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In the second chapter, we measure how establishment of discount variety stores affect
local grocery stores. Since we focus on a particular discount grocery chain, we cannot
extrapolate the findings to other grocery concepts like corner shops or supermarkets. For
instance, consumers that primarily shop at supermarkets (and not discount grocery stores)
could have less elastic demand and be less responsive to discount variety establishments. A
natural extension would therefore be to include more grocery store formats in the analysis.
Moreover, we only consider the effect of establishment on aggregated demand. Future
studies could use individual-level data to identify underlying factors that determine how
individual consumers respond.
In the third chapter, we assume that retailers may invest in a substitute to the supplier’s
product (e.g. a private label) prior to receiving an offer from the supplier. Other papers,
like Katz (1987), suppose that investments take place afterwards, and only in case the
retailer rejects the supplier’s offer. In reality, the timing of investments is probably not
as black and white: Consider a retailer that invests in a private label. To have a credible
threat, an upfront investment might be necessary. Suppose then that the retailer rejects the
supplier’s offer and actually wants to produce its own brand. This would most likely require
some marketing of the private label, illustrating the need for additional investments. A
suggestion for future research is to extend the model to allow for several investment stages.
Furthermore, the retailers in our model invest in an alternative source of supply that they
might end up not using. The assumption that the retailers only sell the supplier’s brand or
a private label could be too strict in some situations. In grocery stores, for instance, one
often finds both private labels and national brands. In a next phase, the model could enable
retailers to offer a combination of private labels and the supplier’s product. Finally, I want
to mention our brief analysis of how a large retailer can strategically over- or underinvest to
induce exit or prevent entry of a smaller rival. A more thorough examination of entry/exit
would be useful and could potentially be a paper on its own. Considering that current
research on this topic is incomplete, additional studies are in demand.
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Abstract
In this paper, we address how targeting and consumer multi-homing impact platform com-
petition and market equilibria in two-sided markets. We analyze platforms that are financed
by both advertising and subscription fees, and let them adopt a targeting technology with
increasing performance in audience size: a larger audience generates more consumer data,
which improves the platforms’ targeting ability and allows them to extract more ad rev-
enues. Targeting therefore increases the importance of attracting consumers. Previous lit-
erature has shown that this could result in fierce price competition if consumers subscribe
to only one platform (i.e. single-home). Surprisingly, we find that pure single-homing pos-
sibly does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. Instead, platforms might rationally set prices
that induce consumers to subscribe to more than one platform (i.e. multi-home). With
multi-homing, a platform’s audience size is not restricted by the number of subscribers on
rival platforms. Hence, multi-homing softens the competition over consumers. We show
that this might imply that equilibrium profit is higher with than without targeting, in
sharp contrast to what previous literature predicts.
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1.1 Introduction
Media platforms compete for consumer attention. While some consumers are devoted to
a single media provider, others spread their attention across multiple platforms.1 The
emergence of digital technologies has facilitated the latter, which we refer to as consumer
multi-homing. All it takes to read an additional newspaper online, is a few extra clicks. In
contrast, to access more print news, one has to go out and buy another newspaper.2
For ad-financed platforms, the distinction between exclusive (single-homing) and shared
(multi-homing) consumers is utterly important. Having exclusive access to certain con-
sumers implies that advertisers cannot reach them elsewhere, allowing the platforms to
price their ad space accordingly. Consumers that are shared with other platforms, on the
other hand, are typically worth less in the ad market. Since the advertisers can reach
these consumers on other platforms as well, the platforms can only charge advertisers the
incremental value of an additional impression. This is known as the incremental pricing
principle (see e.g., Ambrus et al., 2016; Athey et al., 2018 and Anderson et al., 2018).
In the digital era, platforms increasingly adopt advanced advertising technologies such
as targeting. This can help identify the consumers that are most likely to buy the adver-
tisers’ product and make sure that impressions are directed towards the most promising
candidates. Our model incorporates a targeting technology with increasing returns to scale
in the audience size. One could, for instance, think of a machine-learning algorithm that
improves as it is exposed to more consumer data. Platforms that collect more user data
could therefore be better able to connect advertisers with the target audience. The upshot
is that advertisers might be willing to pay more per impression on platforms with a large
audience and higher targeting ability.3
Previous studies have shown that targeting might increase competition and benefit
consumers through lower subscription prices (see e.g. Kox et al., 2017; Crampes et al.,
2009).4 Moreover, the studies emphasize that the additional revenues from the ad side of
1This has caught the attention of a number of researchers, such as Ambrus et al. (2016), Athey et al.
(2018), Anderson et al. (2017; 2018; 2019).
2Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) and Affeldt et al. (2019) argue why digital technologies make multi-
homing more compelling.
3Goettler (2012) studies broadcast networks and provides empirical evidence that the ad price per
viewer might increase in audience size.
4Kox et al. (2017) explicitly examine targeting, while Crampes et al. (2009) consider a more general
advertising technology.
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the market tend to get competed away on the consumer side of the market, leaving the
platforms worse off. Kox et al. (2017) also point out that even though it would be in
the platforms’ common interest not to target ads, each platform might have individual
incentives to do so. These findings are, however, based on the assumption that consumers
single-home (join a single platform). Despite the relevance to modern media markets, the
literature that combines consumer multi-homing and targeting is scarce. The purpose of
this paper is to enrich the theoretical understanding of this phenomenon.
We scrutinize the outcomes under both single-homing and multi-homing, and investigate
whether they constitute Nash equilibria. In line with existing literature, we find that
targeting generates a prisoner’s dilemma situation under the assumption of single-homing.
But remarkably, we find that platforms may not want to set subscription prices that makes
consumers prefer single-homing. Indeed, setting prices that incentivize consumers to multi-
home could be a unique equilibrium. Combining elements from Crampes et al. (2009),
Ambrus et al. (2016) and Anderson et al. (2017), we show that things turn out quite
differently if consumers multi-home. In the absence of targeting, consumer multi-homing
makes subscription prices strategically independent: if one platform changes its price, this
has no impact on rival platforms’ optimal price setting. To put it more concretely: suppose
that you are going to purchase The Washington Post and consider to buy a copy of The
New York Times (NYT) as well. When deciding whether to purchase NYT as an additional
newspaper, what matters is the price of NYT (and not The Post).
This does not change if we introduce targeting. However, in that case, the platforms
must take into account that the price setting of rival platforms will affect the profitability
of targeting. If we revert to our previous example: By reducing its subscription price, The
NYT could improve its targeting ability and charge advertisers extra. Since advertisers
are not willing to pay the full extra for shared consumers (recall the incremental pricing
principle), this would be more attractive the larger the number of exclusive consumers.
A price reduction by The Post would, however, increase the number of consumers that
buy The Post in addition to NYT. The NYT’s gain from increased targeting ability would
therefore be counteracted by a greater fraction of shared consumers. Hence, targeting
has surprising consequences. In contrast to what is usually observed, subscription prices
become strategic substitutes: it is less profitable for a platform to reduce its subscription
price if rival platforms do the same.
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Although targeting still makes it optimal to reduce subscription prices when consumers
multi-home, it does not trigger an aggressive response from rival platforms. As a result,
it is more imperative to implement targeting. Yet, softer competition alone cannot ensure
that targeting is profitable. We show that this can only be guaranteed if multi-homing
consumers are sufficiently valuable to advertisers.
Outline. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 1.2, we review related literature. In
sections 1.3 and 1.4, we present a basic model and introduce a targeting technology. In
section 1.5, we compare our results to disclose when targeting is profitable, and in section
1.6, we investigate potential equilibria. We conclude in section 1.7.
1.2 Related literature
This paper draws on two strands of media literature that are not usually brought together.
One strand investigates the importance of consumer multi-homing, and the other examines
the impact of targeted advertising.
Athey and Gans (2010) and Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) were among the first to
address the impact of targeting on media platform competition. The former paper considers
competition between a local platform that is tailored to the local audience (which is the
local advertiser’s intended audience) and a general platform that depends on targeting
technologies to identify the advertiser’s relevant consumer base. Targeting helps the general
platform allocate constrained ad space more efficiently and allows it to accommodate a
larger number of advertisers.
Bergemann and Bonatti (2011) model competition between online and offline media
under the assumption that online media has higher targeting ability. Absent targeting,
each advertiser places ads on several platforms to ensure that it reaches enough consumers.
In this model, consumers’ interests are correlated with their presence on a specific platform.
Increased targeting ability thus allows advertisers to concentrate on just the most relevant
platforms, reducing the overall demand for ads.
More recently, Gong et al. (2019) propose a different approach in which competition for
consumers plays a prominent role. In their model, differences in the platforms’ ability to
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target ads are exogenously given.5 Assuming that consumers dislike irrelevant ads, Gong
et al. suggest that improved targeting reduces the consumers’ nuisance costs. At the same
time, greater targeting ability attracts more advertisers. Hence, platforms with superior
targeting abilities attract more consumers and advertisers, and they are more profitable.
A common feature of these papers is that platform differences are exogenously given.
This gives rise to significant effects on the supply and demand of ads, which would be less
prominent in a model with symmetric platforms (like ours). We disregard the allocative
effects, and allow targeting ability to be determined within the model: by reducing its
subscription price, a platform can increase its audience size and improve its targeting ability.
Since none of the mentioned papers regards subscription fees, a similar interplay between
the two sides of the market does not occur in these papers. This is one explanation of
why we arrive at quite different results. Another reason is that we use a different targeting
technology. As demonstrated by Crampes et al. (2009), the nature of the advertising
technology is decisive for platform behavior and market outcomes.
Regarding the targeting specification, we find the contribution by Hagiu and Wright
(2020) interesting. The paper pays attention to how technologies may improve based on
learning from consumer data. This insight is useful for the understanding of how learning-
based targeting technologies function. A general form of our targeting specification can
be recognized in Crampes et al. (2009), who model the impact of advertising technologies
with constant, decreasing and increasing returns to scale in the audience size, and point
at the limitation of assuming linearity. Although the authors do not accentuate increasing
returns to scale, we argue that the current focus on first-party data and technology makes
this particular specification highly relevant. We therefore use a variant of this technology
in our set-up. Like most previous research on targeting and media platform competition,
Crampes et al. (2009) assume consumer single-homing. We relax this assumption, and
show that this provides entirely different outcomes.
The use of consumer data to target ads has raised privacy concerns. Johnson (2013)
stresses that targeting might be harmful when consumers value privacy. He investigates
the impact of targeting when consumers have access to ad-avoidance tools, and shows that
consumers tend to block too few ads in equilibrium. Kox et al. (2017) incorporate privacy
5In an extension, Gong et al. (2019) allow the platforms to invest in targeting ability, and show that
under-investment is most likely to occur.
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considerations in a work that is closer to ours. In a similar framework, the authors show
that targeting reduces consumer welfare if the disutility of sharing personal information
is greater than the advantage of lower subscription prices. Recall from the Introduction
that Kox et al. also find that platform profits decrease in targeting. As a result, their
model suggests that stricter privacy regulations benefit both consumers and platforms. An
important difference between Kox et al. (2017) and this paper is that the former assumes
a linear advertising technology and consumer single-homing.
This paper adds to the growing literature that covers consumer multi-homing. A key
take away from existing research is the incremental pricing principle that we describe in
the Introduction. Ambrus et al. (2016) emphasize that an implication of advertisers’ lower
valuation of shared consumers is that it is not only the overall demand that counts; the
composition of the demand also matters. When advertisers place ads on platforms with
multi-homing consumers, there is a risk that some consumers have seen the ad before. As
pointed out by Athey et al. (2018), impressing the same consumer twice is less efficient
than impressing two different consumers. We combine this insight of ad-financed platform
markets with elements from the user-financed platform market in Anderson et al. (2017)
to derive a two-sided model with dual source financing.
Although various papers assess different aspects of consumer multi-homing, the litera-
ture that integrates multi-homing with targeted advertising is scarce. There are, however,
a few exceptions. Taylor (2012) investigates how targeting affects platforms’ incentives to
improve content in order to increase their share of consumer attention. The paper focuses
on how the platforms can retain consumer attention. In contrast, we disregard the atten-
tion span of the audience and rather focus on its size. Another exception is D’Annunzio
and Russo (2020), who study the role of ad networks and how tracking technologies af-
fect market outcomes. However, since they focus on a different part of the industry (ad
networks), they address other and complementary questions.
1.3 The model
We consider two media platforms that offer subscriptions to consumers and advertising
space (eyeballs) to advertisers. We employ a simple Hotelling (1929) model, with a line
of length one, and assign one platform to each endpoint, i.e., platform 1 is located at
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x1 = 0 and platform 2 is located at x2 = 1. Along the line, there is a unit mass of
uniformly distributed consumers. The distribution represents the consumers’ taste: the
greater distance to a platform, the greater mismatch between the consumer preferences
and the platform characteristics.
We consider two different regimes (which we later analyze whether constitute Nash
equilibria). One of them is a pure single-homing regime (hereafter referred to as the single-
homing regime) where all consumers subscribe to only one platform. The other is a multi-
homing regime where some (but not all) consumers use more than one platform.6 The
outcomes for both regimes are presented.
1.3.1 Consumer demand
Single-homing consumers join only the platform they prefer the most. Let ui represent the
utility a consumer located at x obtains from subscribing to platform i = 1, 2:
ui = v − t|x− xi| − pi. (1.1)
The parameter v > 0 is the intrinsic utility of joining a platform, t > 0 represents the
disutility of the mismatch between the consumer’s preferences and the platform’s charac-
teristics, and pi is the subscription price.
The consumer that is indifferent between only subscribing to platform 1 and only sub-
scribing to platform 2 is located at x̃, where u1 = u2. Consumers to the left of x̃ subscribe
to platform 1 and consumers to the right subscribe to platform 2. Hence, the demand








We do, however, allow consumers to subscribe to both platforms. The utility from dual
subscription equals the sum of the individual utilities:
u1+2 = 2v − t− p1 − p2. (1.3)
6With complete multi-homing, targeting would neither affect demand nor subscription prices. In this
case, the analysis simply boils down to the change in ad prices.
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If the incremental utility of multi-homing is positive for some consumers, u1+2(x) ≥
ui(x), those consumers will subscribe to both platforms. Hence, each platform potentially
serves two groups of consumers: exclusive subscribers and subscribers who are shared with
the rival platform.
Let x12 represent the location of the consumer who is indifferent between subscribing
to just platform 1 and subscribing to both platform 1 and platform 2.7 Since platform 2
does not provide any additional utility to the indifferent consumer, u1+2 = u1. Platform
1’s exclusive demand then arises from the consumers who are located to the left of x12. It
follows that the platforms’ shared demand is made up by the consumers located between
x12 and x21. This is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Demand platform i = 1, 2.
We solve u1+2 = u1 and u1+2 = u2 and find x12 =
1
t
(−v + t+ p2) and x21 = 1t (v − p1),
respectively. With symmetric platforms, we get that platform i’s exclusive demand is given
by
xei =
−v + t+ pj
t
, (1.4)
whereas its shared demand equals
xshi =
2v − t− pi − pj
t
. (1.5)









7Vice versa, x21 represents the location of the consumer that is indifferent between subscribing to only
platform 2 and both platform 2 and platform 1.
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Equation (1.6) tells us that total demand for platform i is independent of the rival
platform’s subscription price (pj). A change in pj will, however, affect the composition of
platform i’s demand. From equation (1.4), we see that the number of exclusive subscribers
is increasing in pj, while equation (1.5) shows an inverse relationship between the number
of shared subscribers and pj.
1.3.2 Advertisers and Platforms
Turning to the advertising side, we normalize the number of advertisers to one. The demand
for ads is perfectly elastic, and we assume that each advertiser purchase space for one ad
per platform. In line with the incremental pricing principle, we assume that the advertisers
are willing to pay αi to reach an exclusive consumer, but only a fraction σαi to reach a







where superscripts k = S and k = M represent the single-homing regime and the multi-
homing regime, respectively.


















Consider first a model without targeting. In this situation, we assume that the advertiser
value of reaching a consumer is not platform dependent, such that αi = αj = α. We





















The first square bracket on the right-hand side of equation (1.9) deals with the consumer
8This corresponds to Anderson et al. (2018).
9We set all costs to zero to simplify the model.
20
side of the market, corresponding to a standard one-sided model. If we consider an increase
in pi, this implies that each consumer pays more, but it also means a lower number of
subscribers. In our two-sided model, the price increase has an impact on the ad side of
the market as well: platform i displays fewer ads and thereby loses ad revenues. This is
captured by the second square bracket. Because of the negative effect a price increase has
on ad revenues, the optimal subscription price is lower in a two-sided model.




and pSi (pj) =
t+ pj − α
2
. (1.10)
We note that in the multi-homing regime, subscription prices are strategically inde-
pendent.10 In other words, platform i’s subscription price is not responsive to changes in
platform j’s subscription price. To see why, suppose that platform j adjusts pj. From
section 1.3.1, we know that even though it alters the number of exclusive and shared con-
sumers, the price change has no effect on platform i’s total demand. This is because the
location of platform i’s marginal consumer stays the same. Keep in mind that the marginal
consumer is located where her incremental value of subscribing to platform i is zero. Hence,
platform i’s subscription price still extracts the marginal consumer’s incremental benefit.
Besides, platform i’s price setting does not affect the advertisers’ valuation of the marginal
consumer. Consequently, platform i has no incentive to change its subscription price in
response to an adjustment in pj. In the single-homing regime, we get the standard result
that prices are strategic complements.
Lemma 1 (No targeting) Subscription prices are
(i) strategic complements in the single-homing regime
(ii) strategically independent in the multi-homing regime
1.4 Introducing targeting
Next, we introduce targeting to our model. We recognize that advertisers may not only
care about the reach of ads, but also about the quality of the match with the audience.
Suppose that the platforms implement targeting technologies that enable them to create
10This is in line with Anderson et al. (2017).
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better matches between advertisers and viewers. Moreover, the technology becomes more
accurate as the platforms increase their audience size and thereby generate more data.11
We assume that advertisers are willing to pay for improvements in the platforms’ targeting
ability, and formulate the ad price as follows:
αki = α(1 + ϕD
k
i ) (1.11)
where ϕ is a dummy that takes on the value one when targeting is included in the model and
zero otherwise. Notice that in the latter case, equation (1.11) reverts to the non-targeting
ad price (α). For ϕ equal to one, the definition implies that the ad price is increasing in the
platform’s audience size (
∂αki
∂Dki
> 0), capturing the benefit of having more consumer data
and improved targeting ability.
In the targeting model, α is interpreted as measurement of how efficiently the platforms
are using consumer data to improve their targeting ability. As we proceed, we will see how
this adjustment of the model can change the results drastically.
Inserting equation (1.11) into equation (1.8), and differentiating with respect to own

























When ϕ equals zero, we recognize equation (1.12) as the first-order condition in the
model without targeting (cf. equation (1.9)). The two additional terms that appear when ϕ
equals one represent the effects that emerge when we incorporate targeting. First, consider
the third term on the right hand side. It tells us that ad revenues are more sensitive to
changes in the number of ad impressions (in response to a change in the subscription price)
than without targeting.12 The explanation is that the ad price, which corresponds to the
first part of the third term (cf. equation (1.11)), is higher with targeting (ϕ = 1). Second,
we evaluate the fourth term. This expression captures a property that is not present in the
model without targeting, namely that a platform’s ad price responds to changes in its own
11We assume that each consumer delivers one data point, such that we measure the amount of data by
the number of consumers.
12Since each consumer is impressed once, the number of subscribers is equivalent to the number of ad
impressions.
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subscription price. An increase in pki causes a reduction in α
k
i , and vice versa.
Solving equation (1.12) for pki , we find the best-response functions:
pMi (pj) =
v (t+ α)− α (t+ 3vσ)− αpj (1− σ)
2(t− ασ)
and pSi (pj) =
t (t− 2α) + pj (t− α)
2t− α
. (1.13)
The best-response functions reveal a striking difference between the single-homing regime
and the multi-homing regime. If all consumers single-home, subscription prices are strategic
complements (dpSi /dpj > 0). In contrast, if at least some consumers multi-home, subscrip-
tion prices are strategic substitutes (dpMi /dpj < 0). This means that the optimal response
to changes in the rival platform’s subscription price depends on whether consumers only
single-home or if some of them multi-home.
We can state:
Proposition 1 (Targeting) When platforms target ads, subscription prices are
(i) strategic complements in the single-homing regime
(ii) strategic substitutes in the multi-homing regime
The first result in Proposition 1 is well known in the literature: in a single-homing
regime, the best response to a change in the rival subscription price is to adjust own price
in the same direction.
The second result in Proposition 1, however, is quite surprising. While platform i’s
best response to a change in the rival subscription price is to do nothing in the multi-
homing model without targeting (cf. Lemma 1), the best response in the targeting model
is to adjust pMi in the opposite direction. Since targeting does not change the property of
total demand being independent of the rival subscription price, the difference between the
models may not be intuitive. After all, this property implies that pMi extracts the marginal
consumer’s incremental benefit regardless of any changes in pMj . The key to understanding
why a change in pMj still induces a response, is that targeting enables platform i to affect
the advertisers’ willingness to pay. To see why, suppose that platform j increases pMj . This
creates a shift from shared to exclusive subscribers for platform i, which implies a smaller
share of discounted ad impressions. Platform i would therefore gain from increasing its ad
price. Targeting enables the platform to do so by reducing pMi and improving its targeting




1.5 When is targeting profitable?
In this section, we compare the outcomes with and without targeting, and reveal when tar-
geting is profitable. First, we find the symmetric non-targeting equilibrium prices. Solving




and pS = t− α. (1.14)
We then find the symmetric targeting equilibrium prices (the asterisk superscript de-








= t− 2α. (1.15)
Comparing equations (1.14) and (1.15), we observe that subscription prices are lower
when platforms target ads, irrespective of whether all consumers single-home or if some
multi-home.
Targeting provides greater incentives to attract a larger audience, and to do so, the
platforms lower their subscription prices.
We can state:
Lemma 2 Subscription prices will be lower when platforms use targeting technologies.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the following, we first analyze the single-homing regime, then proceed to the multi-
homing regime.
1.5.1 Single-homing
We restrict our attention to markets with full coverage and endogenously non-negative
prices. This, as well as fulfillment of the stability and second-order conditions, is ensured
by Condition 1:
Condition 1 (Single-homing) 5
2
α < t < 2
3
(v + α).
It follows from Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 that targeting leads to fiercer price compe-
tition.
24







It follows that subscription revenues are lower with targeting. Even though ad revenues
are higher, they do not fully compensate for the lost subscription revenues. Inserting (1.16),







(2t− α) and πS = 1
2
t. (1.17)
Equation (1.17) shows clearly that the targeting profit is lower than the non-targeting
profit and decreasing in the technology’s sensitivity to more data. The reason is that
the higher α, the greater the incentive to reduce the subscription price, which significantly
reduces subscription revenues. This raises the question of whether the platforms at all wish
to adopt targeting technologies. Although it is in the platforms’ common interest not to
target, each platform has incentives to deviate from the mutually beneficial strategy. The
platforms might therefore end up in a prisoner’s dilemma situation where all platforms
target (see also Kox et al., 2017).
We state:
Lemma 3 (Prisoner’s dilemma) When all consumers single-home, targeting is a dominant
strategy and the platforms end up in a prisoner’s dilemma.
Proof. See Appendix.
As we demonstrate in the equilibrium analysis, the platforms could, however, be better
off by setting the multi-homing price and also attract consumers who already subscribe to
the rival platform.
1.5.2 Multi-homing
Assume now consumer multi-homing. We consider partial multi-homing, i.e. situations
where some, but not all, consumers use both platforms. Note that t > 1
2
(v + 3σα) and
t < v+σα ensure the existence of exclusive and shared consumers, respectively. Moreover,
we confine the analysis to situations with endogenously non-negative subscription prices
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and parameter values that satisfy all second-order and stability constraints. The conditions
are given in the Appendix.
From Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 it follows that targeting provides incentives to reduce
the subscription price, and that the rival platform will respond favorably. Moreover, the
incentive to lower the price increases with advertisers’ willingness to pay for shared con-
sumers. This is captured in our model by the σ-parameter, where ∂pM
∗
/∂σ < 0. The price
reduction contributes to greater overall demand, and the increase is reinforced by the rival






For targeting to be profitable, two conditions must therefore be satisfied: (i) Ad revenues
must increase with targeting; and (ii) the increase in ad revenues must be greater than the
loss in subscription revenues. Comparing ad revenues with and without targeting, we
find that ad revenues are greater with targeting if σ > 1
3
. However, if σ ≤ 1
3
, that is
not necessarily true. The smaller σ, the lower is the ad price the platforms can charge
for impressing shared consumers. This is particularly harmful in combination with weak
platform preferences (low t), because targeting then creates a greater shift from exclusive
consumers to shared consumers. A larger proportion of less valuable shared consumers
could, in this case, offset the advantage of an increased ad price.
Finally, whether targeting is profitable or not thus depends on σ. We find it useful to
consider σ > 1
3
and σ ≤ 1
3
separately. The exact calculations are found in the Appendix.
First, we look at the case where σ > 1
3




σ (σ + 1)
)
is
required to satisfy the multi-homing conditions. The more responsive the ad price is to
the audience size (α) and the more advertisers value shared consumers (σ), the stronger
incentives the platforms have to set lower subscription prices, and the greater must the
intrinsic utility (v) be to ensure non-negative subscription prices.
As σ goes towards 1
3




+ ε. For both vmin and σmin, we have that targeting provides greater profits:
(πM
∗ − πM)|vmin > 0 and (πM
∗ − πM)|σmin > 0.
Moreover, we have that the difference between profits with and without targeting is




|vmin > 0), and the difference is increasing
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|σmin > 0). Finally, higher v-values enhance the
increase in (πM









In sum, this means that targeting is profitable for all σ > 1
3
. We then consider σ ≤ 1
3
.
Because shared consumers have lower value in the ad market for small σ−values, the
incentives to increase the audience size are weaker, and positive subscription prices can be
achieved even for v < α. For σ ≤ 1
3
, targeting does not necessarily increase ad revenues.
Since targeting also reduces subscription revenues, it might lead to lower profits.
We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (Multi-homing). Suppose that the multi-homing conditions hold. Targeting
is profitable if advertisers place a high enough value on shared consumers. A sufficient




Combining Lemma 3 and Proposition 2, gives us the following corollary:
Corollary 1 Targeting can only be profitable in the multi-homing regime
1.6 Equilibrium analysis
We now proceed to comparing the market outcomes with pure single-homing and multi-
homing and examining the existence of Nash equilibria. In this part, we restrict our atten-
tion to parameter values that fulfill the conditions for both the single-homing model and
the multi-homing model. From Condition 1, we have that this requires that v > 11
4
α. To
illustrate the key point, we set v = 3α, which is close to the minimum v−value. In the
Robustness section in the Appendix, we show that the results we arrive at are valid also
for v > 3α, at least if shared consumers are not virtually worthless to advertisers.
Condition 2 ensures partial multi-homing in the multi-homing regime, non-negative
prices and full market coverage in the single-homing regime, in addition to satisfying second-
order and stability conditions.








Figure 1.2: Equilibrium prices.
1.6.1 Comparison of equilibrium outcomes
Comparing the subscription prices in equation (1.15), we find that pS
∗ ≥ pM∗ for σ > 2
3
. For
lower σ, the single-homing price may be both greater and smaller than the multi-homing
price, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 (parameter values: t = 3α and α = 1).
When σ is low, the platforms have weaker incentives to reduce the multi-homing price.
However, the higher t, the greater price reduction is required to persuade consumers to
multi-home. Hence, if t is sufficiently high (the condition is given in the Appendix), the
multi-homing price could still be lower than the single-homing price. Conversely, a higher
σ (corresponding to shared consumers being more valuable) provides stronger incentives to
reduce subscription prices in the multi-homing regime. This is why we observe that pM
∗
decreases in σ, both in absolute value and relative to pS
∗
.





). Finally, we consider profits. We find that if σ ≥ 0.65, single-homing profits




). For σ < 0.65, however, profits
may or may not be greater with single-homing. A sufficiently high t can ensure that single-
homing makes the platforms better off. This is illustrated by Figure 1.3 (parameter values:
t = 3.3α and α = 1).13
From the analysis of subscription prices we know that consumers who subscribe to only
13We use different sets of parameter values in the two figures because it enables us to demonstrate that
prices and profits can be both higher and lower with single-homing compared to multi-homing.
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium profits.
one platform are better off in a multi-homing regime when σ > 2
3
, since pS
∗ ≥ pM∗ .
Moreover, we find that at least some consumers prefer multi-homing over single-homing
if σ > 2
9
.
The following proposition sums up the comparison of equilibrium outcomes:
Proposition 3 Assume that condition 2 holds and that σ > 2
3
.
Compared to pure single-homing, multi-homing provides
(i) lower subscription prices and higher consumer utility
(ii) higher ad revenues
(iii) higher platform profits
Proof. See Appendix.
By nature, single-homing profits do not depend on the value of shared consumers (σ).
Multi-homing profits, on the other hand, are either increasing in σ or have a U-shaped
relationship with σ. An increase in σ means that shared consumers are more valuable
to advertisers. Since this allows the platforms to charge a higher ad price, one might
expect that it would lead to greater platform profits. For most parameter values, profits
are indeed unambiguously increasing in σ. An increase in the value of shared consumers
also makes the platforms eager to attract more of them. But suppose that consumers have
very strong platform preferences (high t). Attracting a larger audience may then require
a price drop that is more costly than the additional revenue from gained consumers. This
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could be the case if the value of shared consumers, even after an increase, remains fairly
low. Consequently, the overall impact on profits could be negative. However, as σ takes on
higher values, profits will eventually start to increase. Figure 1.3 illustrates this U-shaped
relationship between σ and multi-homing profits.
1.6.2 The existence of Nash equilibria
Next, we investigate whether single-homing and multi-homing constitute potential Nash
equilibria. If shared consumers are sufficiently valuable, it pays off to charge lower subscrip-
tion fees and forgo some subscription revenues in order to extract more ad-side revenues.
Moreover, if the platforms set multi-homing prices, some consumers will actually subscribe
to both platforms.
If, on the other hand, the advertiser valuation of shared consumers is low (small sigma),
multi-homing might not constitute an equilibrium. In a situation with weak platform
preferences (low t), a reduction in the subscription price would be efficient in attracting
many consumers, making it tempting to undercut the rival’s subscription price and only
serve more valuable exclusive consumers. Both platforms would in that case deviate from
multi-homing. However, as long as σ > σ∗ = 0.03, we find that it is never beneficial for a
platform to deviate from multi-homing. Recall that σ ∈ (0, 1), which means that there is
only a small interval where deviation from multi-homing might be feasible.
Then, consider the single-homing regime. Unless shared consumers have very little
value for advertisers, the platforms have strong incentives to deviate from setting the single-
homing price. More precisely, we find that it is profitable for a platform to deviate from
single-homing for all σ > 0.1.
The most obvious reason is that deviation enables the platforms to sell more subscrip-
tions and ad impressions. But even if shared consumers are not that valuable (i.e. σ < 0.1),
single-homing does not constitute an equilibrium.
The single-homing prices would still be so low that some consumers would like to deviate
and subscribe to both platforms.
We can state:
Proposition 4 Assume that condition 2 holds. Then, there exists
(i) a unique equilibrium with multi-homing for σ > σ∗
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(ii) no equilibrium with single-homing for all σ > 0
Remark 1 Multi-homing could also constitute an equilibrium for σ < σ∗, but only if con-
sumers have sufficiently strong platform preferences.
Proof. See Appendix.
The second result of Proposition 4 is particularly interesting. Previous literature has
typically made the stark assumption of single-homing, which we find never takes part in a
targeting equilibrium, and hence might not be an appropriate assumption to make.
1.7 Concluding remarks
This paper has two major contributions: First, we demonstrate the importance of consumer
multi-homing. Multi-homing allows the platforms to attract more subscribers, which is
increasingly valuable in the ad market when platforms use targeting technologies with
increasing returns to scale in the audience size. Moreover, targeting does not trigger an
aggressive price response from the rival platform, as would be the case in a single-homing
regime. Altogether, we find that targeting can only be profitable if we relax the typically
made single-homing assumption.
The second key contribution is an even more important one: we find that pure single-
homing never occurs in equilibrium. This means that existing literature assuming single-
homing might be misleading, and emphasizes that assessing the nature of consumer pur-
chasing behavior (ie. single-homing or multi-homing) is vital to fully understand the impact
of targeting.
Our set-up is partly motivated by the rise of first-party data. Until recently, consumer
data could easily be purchased from third parties. However, increased demand for pri-
vacy has led to new regulations, such as the General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR).
Since GDPR came into force in 2018, compliance has been high on the business agenda,
limiting the utilization of externally collected consumer information. Web browsers in-
creasingly block third-party cookies, and platforms are moving away from third-party data
and towards permission-based, internally collected first-party data.14
14See e.g. Goswami, S. (2020, November 9) and Walter, G. (2021, January 13).
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The industry is already adapting to the new privacy-oriented landscape. Major plat-
forms like The New York Times and The Washington Post have recently developed in-house
solutions in order to control data and targeting.15 The VP of commercial technology and
development at The Washington Post, Jarrod Dicker, says (Washington Post Press release,
July 16, 2019): “User privacy is paramount to us, so we are deeply invested in building
sophisticated tools powered by first-party data”. The machine learning-based tools enable
the newspaper to benefit from data on how the users engage with the platform, and reduce
its reliance on cookie-driven information. The head of ad product for RED, Jeff Turner,
elaborates (Washington Post Press release, July 16, 2019): “Data points like a user’s cur-
rent page view and session on The Post’s site are much more relevant to that user’s current
consumption intention than the information a cookie-driven strategy can offer”. Advertis-
ers cannot find this insight elsewhere, which gives the platforms a competitive advantage.
The focus on privacy has increased the strategic importance of first-party data, which is
also the key to successful targeting in our model.
Our model makes the assumption of ad-neutral consumers. Targeting could, however,
either increase or reduce ad nuisance. On the one hand, privacy concerns might lead to less
consumer satisfaction (Johnson, 2013; Kox et al., 2017). On the other hand, more relevant
ads could please them (Gong et al., 2019). The overall effect is therefore ambiguous. We
leave this analysis for future research. Our model specification says that the platforms’
targeting ability increases at a constant rate as more consumers subscribe. While some
sources claim that the more data, the better targeting results, others suggest that the
benefit of more data will be diminishing at some point. We have not formally analyzed
this issue, but we do not believe that it would change the key properties. Targeting would
presumably still provide similar, but somewhat smaller effects.
We assume that advertisers’ willingness to pay to reach a shared consumer is weakly
lower than their willingness to pay to reach an exclusive consumer, i.e. σ ∈ (0, 1). In an
empirical study of US magazines, Shi (2016) finds that shared consumers are about half as
valuable as exclusive consumers, i.e. σ = 1
2
. This estimate indicates that it is reasonable
to assume that platforms must charge less for consumers that can be reached elsewhere.
One may also ask whether stricter privacy regulations provide greater incentives to
cooperate in order to share data. On the one hand, joining forces to increase the total data
15See Fischer, S. (2020, May 19).
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pool could be seen as an alternative to purchasing third-party data. On the other hand,
stricter regulations might make cooperation less feasible. Furthermore, the perhaps greatest
advantage of first-party data is that it provides the platforms with exclusive insight. This
advantage clearly goes against sharing. Future studies could explore this issue further.
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Appendix
A.1 Conditions for multi-homing
Without targeting, second-order and stability conditions are always satisfied. From the
equilibrium price, which is given by pM = v−σα
2
, we see that v > σα is required for the




2t− v − ασ
t
; xsh =








The restriction of the analysis to partial multi-homing implies that we need xe > 0 and
xsh > 0. This places some additional constraints on the parameter values: 1
2
(v+σα) < t <
v + σα.
With targeting, stability requires t > 1
2
α (σ + 1) and the second-order condition is
satisfied for t > σα. The equilibrium price is given by equation (1.15), and non-negative
prices require that t > αv(3σ−1)

















for which partial multi-homing is ensured by 1
2
(v + 3ασ) < t < v + 1
2
α(1 + 3σ).
Summarizing, this leaves us with the two binding constraints, depending on the value
of σ:
Condition A.1 (Multi-homing) max{1
2
(v + 3σα),αv(3σ−1)








α(1 + σ)} < t < v + σα for σ ≤ 1
3
.








Proof of Lemma 2
Under single-homing, this follows directly as pS
∗ − pS = t− 2α− (t−α) = −α < 0. Under
multi-homing, we have pM
∗ − pM = 1
2
α
2t+α(1−3σ)(v − 2t(1 + σ) − 3vσ + ασ − 3ασ
2), which
is negative if conditions A.1 and A.2 hold. 
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Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the single-homing regime. Suppose platform i targets ads, while platform j does
not. The best-response functions are then
pi(pj) =
t (t− 2α) + pj (t− α)
2t− α
and pj(pi) =
t+ pi − α
2
.
The equilibrium prices are given by (superscript ‘d’ for deviation)
pdi =
3t2 − 6αt+ α2
3t− α
and pj =

















From equation (1.17), we have the symmetric equilibrium profits when both platforms
target and when none of the platforms targets.
































Table A.1: Prisoner’s dilemma.











(α−3t)2 > 0, which is always the case.










(3t−α)2 > 0, which is also always the case.
Hence, platform i’s dominant strategy is to target, regardless of the rival’s decision, and
despite targeting yielding lower profits than not targeting. This means that the platforms
end up in a prisoner’s dilemma when consumers single-home. 
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Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, we start by decomposing profits into ad revenues and subscription
revenues.





∗ − pMDM = −1
4
α2 (2t− v − σα− 2tσ + 3vσ + 3ασ2) 2t−v+ασ+2tσ+3vσ−3ασ2
t(α+2t−3ασ)2 < 0.








We find it useful to consider σ > 1
3
and σ < 1
3
separately.
For σ > 1
3
, we have that vmin ensures higher profits with targeting:
AM
∗ − AM |v=α = α2t
(4t2α(2σ+1)(1−σ)+4tα2(σ−2σ2+6σ3−1)−α3(σ+1)(2σ−1)(3σ−1)2)
(2t+α−3ασ)2 > 0.
















> AM for all σ > 1
3
.
We then consider σ ≤ 1
3
. If t is low, a reduction in the subscription price will turn
many exclusive consumers into shared consumers. But if the shared consumers are not
worth much in the ad market, the benefit for the platform is limited. This implies that
even though targeting increases the ad price, it does not necessarily increase ad revenues
when σ < 1
3
. We illustrate with an example:
Suppose that σ = 0, which yields
AM




The expression is positive if 2tv > α2. If t and v are not sufficiently high relative to α,
this is not the case. Consider, for instance, v = 0.6, t = 0.55 and α = 1. The numerator
(2t− v) (2tv − α2) then equals −0.17, which implies that AM∗ − AM < 0.
Platform profits We then analyze the platform profits. By inserting equations (1.15)
and (1.14) into (1.8), we find the equilibrium profits with and without targeting, respec-




(t− ασ)(α + v)2
(α(1− 3σ) + 2t)2
+
α(2t− v)












(v2 + 2vα(2σ − 1) + 3α2σ2 − 2α2σ − 4tα(1− σ)). (A.2)
Whether higher ad revenues compensate for lower subscription revenues is dependent
on σ. We start by considering σ > 1
3




+ ε. Evaluating multi-homing profits of equation (A.1) and (A.2) at
vmin and σmin, we have that targeting in both cases provides greater profits (π
M∗ > πM):
πM










4tv − (v + α)2
)
> 0.
Moreover, for vmin we have that (π












|σmin = 16t2α (2t− v − α) > 0.
















The numerator is increasing in v, and since it is positive for vmin it is also positive for
larger v−values. In sum, targeting is profitable if σ > 1
3
.
Consider then the case where σ < 1
3
. In this case, targeting does not necessarily
increase ad revenues. Since targeting also reduces subscription revenues, it might lead to
lower profits. 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof consists of three parts:
(i) a) Subscription prices: The subscription prices are given in equation (1.15). The
difference in the prices, pS
∗ − pM∗ = 15α2σ−5αt−5α2+2t2−3αtσ









α2(9σ2 − 90σ + 65) + 3ασ + 5α
)
.
b) Consumer utility: To show that consumer utility is higher with multi-homing, we
need to compare the utility from subscribing to one platform with that of subscribing to two
platforms. The utility from subscribing to one platform only is up=p
S∗
i (x = 1/2) = 5α− 32t,
whereas the utility from subscribing to both platforms is given by up=p
M∗
i+j (x = 1/2) =
t7α−2t+3ασ








30α2σ − 3αt− 10α2 + 2t2 − 3αtσ
α + 2t+ 3ασ
> 0,
which holds for σ > 2
9
. From the analysis of subscription prices, we know that consumers
who subscribe to only one platform are also better off when σ > 2
3
. Hence, a sufficient
condition for all consumers to be better off with multi-homing is that σ > 2
3
.












The difference in ad prices αS
∗ − αM∗ = −1
2
α (7α−2t+3ασ)
2t+α−3ασ < 0, which states that the ad
price is always higher with multi-homing.
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(iii) Profits: The platform profits are given by equations (A.1) and (A.2). The
difference is given by
πS
∗ − πM∗ = (36α
3σ3−3α2σ2(7α+10t)+2ασ(16αt+17α2−4t2)+4t2(2t−3α)−α2(50t−11α))
4(α+2t−3ασ)2 .
We find that single-homing profits cannot be greater than multi-homing profits if σ ≥
0.65 when Condition 2 holds.

Proof of Proposition 4
A stable equilibrium is one in which no player will deviate from a given strategy. We first
examine the incentives to deviate from a multi-homing price setting, and then the incentives
to deviate from a pure single-homing outcome. Finally, we find that the consumers facing
single-homing prices will always deviate and subscribe to an additional platform, such that
single-homing can never be part of an equilibrium.
(i) Deviation from multi-homing
Suppose that platform i believes that the rival prices according to the multi-homing regime:
pj =
v(t+α)−α(t+3vσ)
2t+α(1−3σ) . Could it be optimal for platform i to charge a higher price and only
sell to consumers that do not subscribe to platform j?
We insert pj =
v(t+α)−α(t+3vσ)












2t2 + 3αt+ 3α2 − 3ασ (3α + t)− pi (α + 2t− 3ασ)
t (α + 2t− 3ασ)
and subscription price (superscript ‘d’ for deviation):
pdi =
(2t− 3α) (αt+ α2 + t2)− 3ασ (t2 + αt− 3α2)
(2t− α) (α + 2t)− 3ασ (2t− α)
.
40
Compared to the equilibrium price with multi-homing, the deviation price is always
higher if σ > 2
3




(12α2σ − 5αt− 4α2 − 2t2 + 3αtσ)2
(2t− α) (−α− 2t+ 3ασ)2
.







The above shows that deviation is never profitable if σ > 0.03.
However, for multi-homing to be an equilibrium, it must be true that consumers will























α + 2t− 3ασ
,








α+2t−3ασ > 0 whenever Condition 2 holds, which confirms
that some consumers want to multi-home. Hence, (some) multi-homing consumers have
no incentives to deviate (subscribe to only one platform) when facing multi-homing prices,
and there is a unique equilibrium with multi-homing. 
(ii) Deviation from single-homing
If both platforms price according to single-homing, prices and profits are given by pS
∗
=
t − 2α and πS∗ = 1
4
(2t− α). Suppose that platform i believes that platform j sets the
single-homing price, pS
∗
. If platform i deviates and sets the prices that maximize profits if
also selling to some consumers who buy the rival’s product, we get:
pdi =
αt (σ + 1)− α2 (11σ − 5)
2(t− ασ)
.














−2t4 + 25α4 (σ − 1)2 − 10α3t (1− σ) (5− 3σ) + α2t2 (σ + 9σ2 + 5) + 3αt3 (3− 2σ)
t2 (t− ασ)
.
Examining the above equations shows that deviation is profitable when σ > 0.1. For
t−values in the higher end of Condition 2, it might also be the case for σ < 0.1.
Suppose next that for some σ < 0.1, it is optimal for the platforms to set the single-
homing price. This can only be an equilibrium if the consumers do not subscribe to both
platforms at this price. We insert pS
∗


















) = 10α− 3t.





i , which implies that there exist consumers who want to
subscribe to both platforms when p = pS
∗
. By the same token, deviation is only possible
if some consumers actually subscribe to both platforms at the deviation price. We insert
pS
∗



















3αt (σ + 5)− 5α2 (σ + 1)− 4t2
t− ασ
.







i , and there exist consumers who want to multi-home. Some
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consumers have incentives to deviate and subscribe to more platforms when facing single-
homing prices. Therefore, single-homing can never take part in an equilibrium. 
A.3 Robustness
In the equilibrium analysis, we assume that v = 3α. This provides us with a more tractable
set of constraints. The drawback is that it might bring the robustness of the findings into
question. To shed some light on this issue, we take a closer look at how the results depend
on v.
First, note that πS
∗
does not depend on v, while ∂πM
∗
/∂v > 0 if v > µ ≡ α
2(1−2σ+3σ2)−2αtσ
2(t−ασ) .
Since ∂µ/∂t < 0, the requirement is strictest for tmin . From the conditions, we know that
the lowest possible t is given by 5
2
α. This gives µ|t=2α = α 7σ−3σ
2−1
2σ−5 , which is at its highest
when σ = 0 and yields µ = 1
5
α. Hence, multi-homing becomes relatively more profitable
compared to single-homing for all v > 1
5
α.
We then consider how v affects the platforms’ incentives to deviate from committing
to single-homing and multi-homing. Suppose that we do not fix v. If the rival commits to











> 0 if v > λ ≡ α
2t(σ−1)(3σ−4)−2α3(σ−1)2−αt2σ
(t−α+ασ)2 . This is ensured
by condition (t < v + σα) for all σ > 0.01.
Proof:
v > t− σα > λ if t− σα− λ > 0. We have that:
t− σα− λ = t
3 + α3 (2− σ) (σ − 1)2 + tα2 (4σ − 3) (1− σ)− 2t2α (1− σ)
(t− α + ασ)2
The expression is greater than 0 for all σ > 0.01. 
Unless multi-homing consumers are almost worthless in the ad market, it is certainly
more tempting to deviate from single-homing if v increases from 3α.
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(2tα + vα + α2 − 3α2σ + tv + 2t2 − 3tασ − 3vασ)2
(2t− α) (2t+ α− 3ασ)2






v > µ ≡ 2t
3 − α3 (3σ + 1) (1− σ)− t2α (17σ − 4) + tα2 (7− 16σ + 21σ2)
(t− α + ασ) (7t+ α− 9ασ)
.
This is ensured by condition (t < v + σα) for all σ > 0.026̇.
Proof:
v > t− σα > µ if t− σα− µ > 0. We have that
t− σα− µ = 5t
3 + α3 (1− σ) (4σ − 9σ2 + 1)− 4tα2(2− 8σ + 7σ2) + 2t2α (4σ − 5)
(t− α + ασ) (7t+ α− 9ασ)
is positive for σ > 0.026. 
Deviation is less tempting if v increases from 3α, at least if σ ≥ 0.026̇.
Suppose that σ = 0, which yields µmax =
1
(t−α)(7t+α) (2t
3 + 4t2α + 7tα2 − α3) since
dµ
dσ
< 0. For t ≡ t′ ≤ 6.57α, we find that v ≥ 3α ≥ µ.
dµmax
dt′
> 0. We have that v > t′ (condition (t < v+σα)). This implies that if t′ > µmax ,
then v > µmax. Since
t′ − µmax =
α3 − 8tα2 − 10t2α + 5t3
(t− α) (7t+ α)
> 0
Deviation is less tempting for v > 3α also if σ = 0.
In this section, we have shown that our results are quite robust. Given that multi-
homing consumers are not negligible in the ad market, our results hold for all v > 3α. A
higher v does not make single-homing more attractive relative to multi-homing and it does
not reduce the incentives to deviate from single-homing. Moreover, a higher v makes it less
imperative to deviate from multi-homing. Evaluating v−values below 3α is less interesting
since the lower boundary is given by v = 2.75α.
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Consumers
For a general v, we check whether consumers will subscribe to both platforms when p = pM
∗
.



















2v + α + 3ασ − 2t
2t+ α− 3ασ
.
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We analyze 69 entries and relocations by the Norwegian discount variety chain Europris
during the period 2016 to 2019. We measure how its location choices affect local grocery
stores’ performance, using a diff-in-diff strategy and data from a large Norwegian grocery
chain. We combine detailed data on local grocery stores’ sales, traffic and travelling distance
to new or relocated Europris stores. We find that entries and relocations have significant
effects, suggesting an S-shaped relationship; sufficiently close entries increase local demand
since more customers are attracted to the market, but, as the distance increases, the
competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local grocery sales and
traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually reduced to zero.
We show that this empirical finding can be squared with a simple theoretical model. Our
results confirm theoretical conjectures on agglomeration forces and competitive effects from
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2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore the rise of discount variety retail and how this has changed
the competition towards grocery stores. Over time, grocery stores have broadened their
product range into everything from books to consumer electronics. Likewise, we see a
growing trend where earlier specialized retailers like “dollar stores” and general hardware
stores add groceries to their product range. In 2019, the American discount variety chain
Dollar General expanded its product range to also include fresh grocery products, and since
2003 they have offered food products in a number of stores.1 Today, Dollar General delivers
grocery products to more than 9,000 of its total 16,500 locations.
We have also seen a strong trend in retail towards stores co-locating in malls and
business areas. In this new retail landscape where different chains may both compete
and complement each other, store location choices become less obvious. On one hand,
differences in product range might lead to increased traffic and number of customers when
stores locate very close to one another. On the other hand, increased local competition for
the products that are offered by both chains reduces incentives to co-locate.
To understand how this new mix of product ranges and reduced retail chain special-
ization affect store localization, we analyze the location behavior of the biggest discount
variety chain in Norway, Europris. In particular, we analyze how its location choices affect
one of the largest grocery chains in Norway. Europris has been one of the most successful
retail chains in Norway, establishing a number of new stores across the country. The gro-
cery chain is among the leading discount grocery players in Norway. It serves more than
20% of the national market alone, and is represented across all major regions in Norway.
More than one third of the grocery chain’s product categories are also offered by Europris,
and in terms of sales, as much as one fourth of the grocery chain’s turnover is stemming
from these product categories.
Benefiting from a very detailed grocery data set covering all transactions before and after
the arrival of competing discount variety stores, we use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate
the effect of entry. More specifically, we analyze how sales and customer traffic in local stores
within the grocery chain is affected by Europris establishments and relocations as compared
to a large control group of grocery stores that are not affected by changes in Europris
1The first store appeared in 1939, and in 1955 they took the name Dollar General. Hence, only after
64 years did they expand into food items.
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locations. In all models, we control for local competition and local demographics, including
separate detailed control variables varying on the municipal level. We also have detailed
information on the product overlap between Europris and the grocery chain, allowing us
to estimate separate effects for products that are offered by both chains and products that
are only offered by the grocery chain.
In the case we consider, an incumbent grocery store may be affected by the establish-
ment of a discount variety store with partially overlapping product ranges in two ways.
On the one hand, because the stores only compete on a subset of their product categories,
the grocery store may get new customers due to the increased quality of their location
stemming from the complementarities across stores. Let us think about this as an increase
in the extensive margin: As long as the entering store is differentiated enough with regards
to product range, this co-location effect is likely to be positive (positive demand effect).
This positive effect of establishment should be stronger the closer the new establishment is
located to the incumbent grocery store, and maximized if co-location allows for one-stop
shopping. On the other hand, entry will increase competition for the product categories of-
fered by both stores. This can be interpreted as a reduction in the intensive margin: some
of the incumbent’s existing customers may choose to purchase some products that they
used to buy at the incumbent grocery store at the entrant discount variety store (fiercer
competition).2 This effect will be negative, and stronger the closer the establishment is to
the grocery store.
The net effect of the two effects outlined above is not clear. Furthermore, while we
expect both the positive and negative effects to decrease in size with distance, they may do
so at different rates and thereby give rise to a non-monotonic relationship between distance
between the stores and sales at the incumbent grocery store. For example, it may be that
the agglomeration effect is important when the stores are fairly close, while the competition
effect continues to be important also when the distance is relatively large.
In our empirical analysis, we find that one-stop shopping leads to positive agglomeration
effects, increasing local demand when new stores enter. Perhaps more surprising, our results
provide some support that this holds true both for competing products (offered by both
chains) and non-competing products (offered only by the grocery chain). We also find clear
2The increased competition might also affect prices, but in our case the incumbent is already using
national prices, and thus the effect of the new store will come through changes in sales.
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evidence for a competitive effect that decreases with distance between the stores. What
we find particularly intriguing is that the interplay between the positive agglomeration
forces and the competition effect creates an S-shaped pattern: positive agglomeration forces
dominate for one stop co-locations, but as stores are located further apart, the negative
competition effect gets relatively larger. At some point, the competition effect becomes
dominant before it eventually tapers off. The S-shaped relationship between grocery sales
and distance to the newly established discount variety store suggests that the interplay of
the positive agglomeration effect and the negative competitive effect varies with distance
between the stores.
To gain some additional insight into the mechanisms at play, we develop a simple theo-
retical model that fits our empirical case closely. Using a framework inspired by Hotelling
(1927), we consider how an incumbent store is affected by the entry of a competitor in
its vicinity. The entrant offers a substitute to one of the incumbent’s products at a lower
price. This increases the overall value of shopping in the area where the two stores are
located. While greater competition for products that are sold in both stores reduces the
incumbent’s sales to existing customers, the improved quality of the location attracts new
customers. We find that the overall effect on sales may have an S-shape similar to what
we observe in the empirical analysis. Assuming that one-stop shopping is feasible and pro-
vides an additional benefit, the increased sales to new customers outweigh the lost sales
due to existing customers buying the substitute from the entrant. However, if the distance
between the stores prevents one-stop shopping, the competition effect prevails. In line with
the empirical results, we find that also the competition effect eventually fades out as the
distance between the stores becomes sufficiently large.
We now discuss our empirical results in more detail. In our first main empirical analysis,
we use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect of establishments of discount variety
stores on grocery stores’ sales. When we distinguish between the new entries that allow
for one-stop shopping and those that require customers to stop twice, we see a distinct
pattern: one-stop shopping increases sales by nearly 9%, whereas entries that require the
customers to stop twice have a negative impact on the incumbents’ sales (-4%). The same
pattern holds for store traffic.
The next question we address is how the magnitude of the two effects depend on the
distance between the incumbent and the new store. We explore this question by splitting
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the two-stop shopping entries into different distance bins and re-estimating our models. We
now uncover an intriguing pattern. When we move away from one-stop shopping and up
to a distance of two km, we find a small negative effect (for competing products) on sales
from new entries (-3%). For entries between two and five km away, the negative effect (for
all products) is much larger (-7% to -9%), although it gets smaller and ultimately fades off
for entries even further away.
We attribute this S-shape to the interplay between the two margins. For the entries
relatively close by (250 meters to two km), the extensive margin effect of higher local
demand still has some influence, though the intensive margin effect of fiercer competition
dominates. As we move further away (in our case beyond two km), the competition effect
peaks, generating the maximum negative overall effect. And as we move even further away
in distance, the net effect goes towards zero, which is what we would expect given that
both effects should taper off eventually. Interestingly, we find much the same pattern for
both competing and non-competing product categories, but the effects are, not surprisingly,
higher for the former group.
We show that the results are robust to including controls for local competition, de-
mographics and cases where the change in distance is so small that we are unable to tell
whether the distance has actually decreased. We also perform a Granger test to exam-
ine the presence of anticipatory effects and reverse causality, concluding that the test is
consistent with our econometric diff-in-diff models.
Related literature Stahl (1982) was one of the first to model the trend towards co-
location and one-stop shopping behavior theoretically. He models how the changes in
the sellers’ market demand influence location choices. In particular, he decomposes two
effects: a negative substitution effect generated by competition for consumers’ demand
and a positive market area effect generated from joint location of sellers. If the increase
in demand from joining the bigger market is higher than the effect of fiercer competition,
co-location becomes the optimal choice. This will in turn become a positive externality for
the incumbents already there. Stahl finds that co-location is an equilibrium outcome as
long as customers are choosy enough about the variety of commodities.3
3There are several theoretical studies modelling store choice and store location. Beggs (1994) looks
at the rationale for malls rather than large department stores by modelling demand and pricing com-
plementarities. Smith and Hay (2012) model competition between shopping centers, in particular, how
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Our study speaks to the empirical literature on store choices. Messinger and Narasimhan
(1997) formulate and estimate a model on grocery data that aims to explain the growth
in one-stop shopping. Using U.S. data, they find that increased income and reduced store
operation costs have both increased supermarket assortment and the gains from one-stop
shopping. Over the period 1961-1986 they find that reduction in shopping time has led to
a 2.2% reduction of households’ expenditures on grocery products. Bell et al. (1998) model
store choice behavior based on fixed and variable cost of shopping, attributing the former
to the shopping list (products and quantities) and the latter to travel cost and store loyalty.
They abstain from differences in store assortment. They also take the model to data for a
bigger U.S. city, and find support for fixed cost – shopping list heterogeneity being a major
factor behind store choices. Fox et al. (2004) undertake an exploratory analysis estimating
a model on consumer reported data on purchases to understand how marketing policies
affect shopping behavior across retail store formats. Vitorino (2012) looks at how positive
and negative spillovers among firms affect location choices. She finds empirical support for
firms co-locating despite potential business stealing effects. Her results suggest that the
size of these effects determines the number of firms that can operate in a given local market.
Picone et al. (2009) suggest that even if competitive forces make firms prefer distancing,
they might end up co-locating because of few location options. Not surprisingly, this seems
to be a more likely outcome among firms selling differentiated products. Related to the
questions on store choices, Thomassen et al. (2017) study pricing in supermarkets. They
estimate cross-category pricing effects, and find that the effects are higher the more con-
sumers that prefer one-stop shopping. This has to do with these consumers being inclined
to switch all their purchases to another store in response to a price change on one product
category. Since supermarkets fully internalize the cross-category pricing effects (in contrast
to specialized stores), one-stop shopping contributes to greater price competition.
Several empirical studies have analyzed spatial competition between retail outlets more
generally. Lindsey et al. (1991) analyze the video-cassette-retail market in Alberta to un-
derstand product variety and pricing. In a more recent study of the video-retail market,
Seim (2006) finds empirical support for firms using spatial differentiation in order to reduce
agglomeration effects between products are accommodated through different organizational structures and
to which extent competition in prices and product quality is internalized. They consider three scenar-
ios: streets (no internalization), malls (developers internalize) and supermarkets (where both shops and
developer internalize).
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local competition. Smith (2004) estimates consumer choice in the U.K. supermarket in-
dustry using data on profit margins to deduct price parameters in consumer utility. Davis
(2004) estimates a demand model where products are location specific and consumers have
preferences over geographic proximity and store/product characteristics, to understand
substitution patterns between U.S. motion picture exhibition theaters. He concludes that
travel costs result in limited theater (store) substitutability and localized markets. Houde
(2012) estimates a structural model of spatial competition using consumers’ commuting
paths as instruments for the consumers’ locations in a Hotelling-like model, using data
from the Quebec City retail gasoline market. Based on the model, he simulates the ef-
fects of a merger, and shows that compared to a reduced form diff-in-diff analysis of the
actual merger, the spatial model performs well. Turola (2016) estimates the intensity of
competition in the French grocery retail sector. She builds a structural spatial competition
model, where demand depends on both geography and heterogeneity in the customers’
shopping lists. She recovers price-cost margins, and finds that the competitive pressure is
very localized and depends on the presence of nearby competitors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses our empirical strategy, Section
2.3 presents the data and takes a first look at the market. In Section 2.4 we present and
discuss our econometric results, and robustness is discussed in Section 2.4.3. In Section 2.5
we present a simple theory framework where we discuss the estimated effects, and we also
simulate an outcome mirroring the empirical findings. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Empirical strategy
We want to explore how proximity to a discount variety store (in our case, Europris) affects
grocery store sales. Our empirical strategy exploits the fact that during our sample period,
69 Europris stores were established or relocated. Some grocery stores in our sample were
affected by a Europris establishment in the sense that the distance to the closest Europris
store changed after the establishment or relocation, while others were unaffected, enabling
us to use a diff-in-diff approach to estimate the effect on grocery store sales of having a
discount variety store in the vicinity.4
4We focus on grocery stores that experience a reduction in distance to the closest Europris store. During
our sample period, the locations of all grocery stores are fixed, implying that any changes in distance stem
from Europris entries or relocations.
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We refer to grocery stores that were affected by Europris establishments as treatment
stores and to grocery stores that were unaffected as control stores. We know the distance
to the closest Europris store for all the grocery stores in our data set in every week of
our sample period. This implies that regardless of whether we look at relocations or new
entries, we always consider a change from a given pre-distance. Hence, the estimated
effect of a relocation and a new entry will be parallel, and we do not need to distinguish
between these when evaluating the results. From now on, we will refer to both of them
as establishments. Furthermore, while some of the treated grocery stores ended up with
a Europris store next door after an establishment, other treatment stores remained some
distance away. This allows us to break down the effect of a Europris establishment by
distance bins and to explore how the effect of having a discount variety store close by
depends on the distance between the stores. The underlying assumption that allows us
to interpret our results causally is that the underlying trend in the grocery store sales is
not dependent on treatment status. We provide visual support for this common trend
assumption and show a Granger causality test in the Robustness section (section 2.4.3).
Since both the grocery chain and Europris have national pricing strategies, it is very
unlikely that prices in local grocery stores are affected by the distance to the closest Europris
store.5 We are therefore confident that any effects of a Europris establishment will manifest
themselves through changes in the sales volume and store visits in the grocery store (rather
than in changes in prices).
A central distinction in our analysis is between one-stop and two-stop shopping. In
some places, the grocery store and Europris are located close enough to one another for
customers to reach both stores from the same parking area. We define one-stop shopping
locations as those where the distance between the stores is 250 meters or less. In some of
our analyses we lump together all cases where the distance is above 250 meters as two-stop
locations, while in other analyses we break down the two-stop locations into distance bins.
5Meile (2020) studies the price setting of Norwegian grocery retail chains empirically, and finds that
the grocery chain we consider follows a national, uniform pricing strategy. Uniform national pricing is
also confirmed in Friberg, Steen and Ulsaker (2021). Regarding Europris, we look at the information on
the chain’s website. We find that the online prices (which at least apply to home delivery and in-store
pickup) do not differ across stores and that weekly ads apply throughout the chain, suggesting that prices
are decided centrally.
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2.3 Data and a first look at the market
2.3.1 Data
We combine data from several sources. The main data set used in our analyses is sales data
received from the grocery chain. We have weekly sales data at the store-category level as
well as weekly store visits. We have data from all product categories, which implies that
we can both look at total weekly sales at the store level and separate out sales for products
that are also sold at Europris. The sample period is from 11 January 2016 to 22 December
2019.
The next step is to compile geographical location data. We obtained data on the
address, opening date and closing date (where applicable) of all Europris stores in Norway
directly from the chain (Europris, 2020). The data was received on 11 February 2019.6
The sales data from the grocery chain also contains information about the grocery stores’
addresses. The exact locations of the Europris and grocery stores were obtained through
Google Maps Platform’s Geocoding API.7
For a given grocery store in a given week, we want to find the distance and driving
duration to the closest Europris store. To calculate distance and duration, we use the
routing service of the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA).8 For each grocery
store and each week, we then use the distance and duration of the closest Europris store
that was open in the week in question.
We include a number of additional control variables in our regressions. Statistics Norway
publishes yearly municipality level data on persons and land area, as well as median after
tax income and the percentage of the population with higher education ssbPopArea, ssbInc,
ssbEduc. From the grocery chain, we obtained a data set with yearly information about
all grocery stores in Norway (from all chains), including information about revenue at the
store level. This data set was used to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at
the municipality level, using market shares both at the store level and at the chain level.
6With updates on 2 July 2019 and 15 May 2020.
7See https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/geocoding/overview for documentation of
this service. The locations were obtained on 15 October 2020.
8See https://labs.vegdata.no/ruteplandoc/ for documentation of this routing service. The routing
service was accessed on 15 October 2020, which means that all duration and distances were calculated with
the road network that applied on that date.
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2.3.2 A first look at the market
Discount variety retail in Norway
Among discount variety retailers in Norway, Europris is the largest with a market share
of about 30%.9 Since its foundation in 1992, both revenues and the number of stores
have grown steadily, reaching more than six billion NOK in revenue and 264 stores in
2019. While the compound annual grown rate for total retail was about 3% for 2012-2017,
variety retail grew almost twice as fast, suggesting that with overlapping product ranges
grocery chains were loosing market shares to variety retail (Europris ASA capital markets
day presentation 2018). Few other retail segments than discount variety retailers can look
back at a similar increase in revenues in recent years. Table 2.1 and table 2.2 show the
growth in Europris revenues and the number of store establishments and relocations in the
years we consider (Europris ASA annual report 2017; Europris ASA annual report 2019).
Table 2.1: Europris growth rate 2016-2019
2016 2017 2018 2019
Growth in Revenues 9.8% 6.6% 7.3% 7.2%
Table 2.2: Europris establishments and relocations 2016-2019
2016 2017 2018 2019
New stores 11 11 9 6
Relocated stores 11 7 8 6
According to the latest Shopper Trend report (Nielsen 2020), more than 50% of the
respondents answered that they had bought groceries from a discount variety retailer within
the last six months, and the store most frequently visited was Europris.
A comparison of the assortment in Europris and the grocery chain shows that the extent
of product overlap is large: as much as 35% of the grocery chain’s product categories are
also sold in Europris stores, and these product categories amount to 25% of the grocery
chain’s turnover.10
9The first and second runners-up, Biltema and Clas Ohlson have approximately 20% and 15% respec-
tively.
10To find the product overlap, we first looked up all the product categories that Europris offers online
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The Norwegian producers are more concentrated as compared to producers in other
grocery markets e.g., Sweden. This, together with particular high tariff-barriers has led
to very strong national brands, and though increasing, private labels have a relatively low
share in the Norwegian grocery market. This implies that the same products are often
found in different stores - even across grocery chains. This is indeed also the case for many
of the products that are sold by both Europris and the grocery chain.
The grocery stores
Our data sample consists of 190 distinct grocery stores. The stores are distributed all over
Norway, but only stores located in municipalities where Europris establishments or reloca-
tions took place during our sample period place are included. Because retail competition
is likely to function differently in city centres than in suburban and rural areas, we drop
observations in the municipalities of Oslo, Bergen city center and Trondheim city center.
In the main analysis, we also disregard stores in the vicinity of Europris entries but where
it is unclear whether the distance to the closest Europris store was reduced or not after
entry.11 The number of active grocery stores in a given week ranges from 149 to 180. Figure
2.1 below shows the distribution of the stores by distance to the closest Europris store in
the first and last sample week.
(such as detergent, filter coffee, and pick-and-mix candy). We then compared this to the data set we
obtained from the grocery chain, which includes information about product categories.
11In some cases, whether or not entry reduces the distance between the grocery store and the closest
Europris store depends on the direction of travel or the exact route chosen. In appendix A.3 we include
the model outcomes when these additional 16 stores are included
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Figure 2.1: Density of grocery stores over distance to closest Europris store
Most of the grocery stores are located within a few kilometers of a Europris store, and
the distribution shifts slightly to the left over the period we consider. In the first week, 134
out of 149 grocery stores are closer than 15 km to Europris. In the last week, the same is
true for 175 out of 180 stores. The summary statistics in Table 2.3 provide closer details.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Distance 34228 5.69 10.02 0.00 75.11 1.08 2.71 6.09
The average distance from a grocery store to the closest Europris is 5.69 km. The
shortest distance is 0.0 km, while the longest distance is about 75 km.
The main variables of interest are activity indicators: sales and store traffic.12 Table
2.4 shows the average store activity across all grocery stores in the data set.
Table 2.4: Average store activity
Weekly sales Store traffic
All stores 1 232 886 5503.63




As we argued above, the effect of establishment may depend on the distance between the
stores. Hence, we define the following distance categories:
Table 2.5: Distance categories
Distance bin Binary category
Same parking 1 One stop
250m-2km 2 Two stops
2km-5km 3 Two stops
5km-15km 4 Two stops
More than 15km 5 Two stops
The grocery stores in category 1 are located within 250 meters from a Europris store,
which we define as close enough for the customers to visit both the grocery store and
Europris in one stop. Table 2.6 below shows store activity by distance categories.
Table 2.6: Average store activity by distance category
Weekly sales Store traffic Number of stores
Same parking 1 341 951 5613.08 6
250m-2km 1 275 654 5980.73 67
2km-5km 1 265 425 5516.03 59
5km-15km 1 157 070 5176.06 45
More than 15km 1 076 884 4071.88 13
The grocery stores that can be reached from the same parking area as a Europris store
have the highest weekly sales and second highest store traffic, while the stores with the
longest distance to a Europris store have the lowest turnover and store traffic. Overall,
however, the differences are not large between the groups.
The store composition: Control and treatment groups
For descriptive purposes, we consider the 142 stores that are never affected as control stores
and the 48 stores that at some point become affected as treatment stores.13 Table 2.7 and
Table 2.8 summarize the distance statistics by treatment status.
13Table 2.1 in Appendix A.1 shows the number of stores by treatment status and distance category.
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Table 2.7: Summary statistics for control group
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Distance 24738 4.43 4.76 0 40.07 1.30 2.96 6.04
Table 2.8: Summary statistics for treatment group
Count Mean Sd Min Max p25 p50 p75
Pre-distance 9490 15.66 19.67 0.41 75.11 3.03 5.67 23.05
Post-distance 9490 3.11 6.32 0.00 31.37 0.31 1.01 2.20
Change 9490 12.55 17.87 0.34 71.76 1.95 3.61 13.18
The average distance to Europris in the control group is 4.4 km, the shortest distance
is 0.0 km and the longest distance is 40.1 km. 75% of the stores in the control group are
located less than 6.0 km from a Europris store, 50% less than 3.0 km and 25% less than
1.3 km.
Compared to the control group stores that have an average distance to the closest
Europris store of 4.4 km, the treatment stores were on average less exposed to Europris
prior to the establishments (15.7 km), but are on average more exposed to Europris in the
post-period (3.1 km).
Looking at the change within the treatment group, the relocations and new establish-
ments led to an average change of approximately 12.6 km. In the pre-period, 50% of the
grocery stores were located less than 5.7 km from a Europris store, and 25% were located
less than 3.0 km away. In the post-period, 50% are located less than 1.0 km from Europris
and 25% less than 310 meters. This shift is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below:
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Figure 2.2: Density of grocery stores in the treatment group over distance
In the first week, 30 treatment stores are closer than 15 km from Europris and 12 stores
are further away. In the last week, 46 out of 48 treatment stores are located within 15 km
from Europris. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 below present the store activity measures by treatment
status and whether the established Europris stores can be visited from the same parking
area as the grocery stores in the post-period.
Store activity by treatment status
As many as 25% of our grocery stores ended up with a Europris store much closer than
previously. As we saw from Figure 2.2 the shift was significant for most stores. To which
extent does this shift result in a change in the activity level? Below in Tables 2.9 and 2.10,
we scrutinize the change in two measures of activity level.
Table 2.9: Average weekly sales
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 1 196 403 -
One stop 1 381 962 1 622 909 1 546 380 17.44 %
Two stops 1 189 723 1 302 516 1 264 461 9.48 %
61
Table 2.10: Average weekly store traffic
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 5508.14 -
One stop 6015.57 6552.26 6350.64 8.92 %
Two stops 4975.26 5130.27 5170.74 3.12 %
We find that for both measures, activity increases after the change. There is also a
distinct pattern where the effect is between two and three times higher for the one-stop
establishments, as compared to cases where customers need to drive between the two stores.
However, these figures represent only a before-after effect. Obviously this change might
be correlated with market growth stemming from other sources. The table also provides
control group averages, and in the next section we will use a diff-in-diff approach where we
use the activity development in the 142 non-affected stores as a control for general market
growth. Note that we also account for the latter group’s distance to the closest Europris
stores and store heterogeneity through store fixed effects.
In Tables 2.2 and 2.3 in Appendix A.2, we show sales and store traffic by treatment
status and post-period distance categories. We observe that generally, the effect from a new
establishment falls with distance. For weekly store traffic we even see negative numbers for
the 2-5 km bin, or basically no effect (0.93%) for the corresponding bin for weekly sales.
2.4 A diff-in-diff analysis of co-location effects
The descriptive analysis above suggested that the arrival of a new discount variety store
close by affects the activity level of the grocery stores. In fact, to the extent that we
could see some clear patterns, co-location – and, in particular, co-location allowing for one-
stop shopping – increased the incumbent grocery stores’ traffic and sales. Regarding the
effect of vicinity in terms of distance when customers need to drive between the stores, the
descriptive evidence of an increase in grocery store activity is weaker. Now, we investigate
these effects econometrically, where we control both for the development in these measures
over time in other grocery stores not affected by establishments, and for the competitive
environment faced by the different stores and the demographics of the area.
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2.4.1 Diff-in-diff analysis disregarding product heterogeneity
Our diff-in-diff model includes several control variables for local competition and local
demographics. We estimate the following generic model:
ln(yit) = αi + λt + ηX it + βDit + εit
Where y is a measure of activity, either weekly sales or store traffic. Subscript i, refers
to store, and t refers to week. The matrix Xit consists of several local controls: Municipality
Herfindal-Hirchman indices on grocery store level, grocery chain level and grocery chain-
umbrella level to control for local and national competition. Demographics are included
through inhabitants per square kilometer, inhabitants per store and the share of higher
education in the municipality. All controls are changing annually and by municipality. We
include fixed effects for store (αi) and week-year (λt), and we allow for clustered standard
errors on the store level.
Our diff-in-diff parameter is β, which measures the effect of the change in distance to
the closest Europris store for the stores in the treatment group. Dit is thus our treatment
variable that for store i in the treatment group takes the value 0 prior to the Europris
establishment, and 1 after.
In Table 2.11 we estimate the overall effect of a reduction in distance to Europris on
the grocery store for the two activity measures:
Table 2.11: Effect of establishment
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Establishment -0.00428 -0.0125
(0.0207) (0.0179)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.835 0.839
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Using this overall approach, we find no significant effects of the new arrivals of Europris
stores. However, this is an overall average effect that combines the effects from both nearby
63
establishments and more distant ones. As we argued above and later show in a simple
theoretical model, there are reasons to believe that the sign of the effect may depend on
the distance between the grocery store and the newly established Europris store. We could
then fail to find an overall effect even if there are actually significant effects for the different
co-location distance bins. Hence, we next differentiate the treatment effect into bins for
different co-location distances, and extend the model to allow for more treatment dummy
variables:




Now, each βb refers to a separate distance bin. We start by differentiating between
one-stop and two-stop shopping: Comparing our distance bin 1 to distance bins 2 to 5 (as
defined in Table 2.5). In Table 2.12 we show the results:
Table 2.12: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.0986** 0.0618
(0.0487) (0.0405)
Two stops -0.0390** -0.0377**
(0.0189) (0.0176)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
In line with the descriptive figures above in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, we now obtain a very
clear result. For both activity measures we find that one-stop co-location increases the
grocery stores’ turnover and store traffic in the range of 6% to 10%. The results reported
in Table 2.12 suggest that the net effect of establishment is negative for the grocery stores
where one-stop shopping is not possible. This applies to both sales and traffic, considering
the reduced activity in the order of -4%. Thus, when accounting for underlying time
trends using a control group and when including control variables, the apparent positive
effect observed in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 only holds for grocery stores where one-stop shopping
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becomes possible after the establishment of a Europris store. For the other grocery stores,
the estimated effect is negative.
That co-location can be beneficial to the incumbent grocery store is in line with most of
the models looking at one-stop shopping. The positive effect found for establishments that
allow for one-stop shopping suggests that the net effect of the positive agglomeration effect
(what we refer to as the extensive margin) and the negative competition effect (what we
refer to as the intensive margin) is positive for these stores. We expect that both effects are
present also when two stops are required to visit both a grocery store and a Europris store,
but that their relative magnitude may depend on the distance between the stores. Our next
step is therefore to differentiate the treatment effects even further, allowing for different
distance bins for the “two-stop-shopping” group of stores. Now we estimate separate effects
for all our five distance bins. The results are shown in Table 2.13.
Table 2.13: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.0986** 0.0619
(0.0487) (0.0405)






More than 15km -0.0170 -0.0120
(0.0154) (0.0243)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Now an interesting pattern emerges. The effect of an establishment is positive when the
stores can be reached from the same parking area. When the stores are between 250 meters
and two km apart, there is no statistically significant effect. When the distance between
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the stores is between two and five km, an establishment reduces sales by 8%. When the
distance is even larger, the effect diminishes and becomes statistically insignificant for stores
where the distance is more than 15 km. Figure 2.3 illustrates how the effects on grocery
weekly sales and traffic vary with distance to the new Europris store. We observe that both
activity measures have an S-shaped pattern.
Figure 2.3: Illustration of estimated S-shape
2.4.2 Diff-in-diff analysis accounting for product heterogeneity
Clearly, we would anticipate to observe heterogeneous effects of Europris establishments
depending on whether we look at competing or non-competing product categories. We now
estimate our model where we allow the treatment effect to depend on the product type.
Hence, we include product interactions in our model:







As before, each βb refers to separate distance bins, but now we estimate separate effects
for all bins for competing product categories (sold by both chains) and non-competing
product categories (only sold by the grocery chain).14 To do so we include separate inter-
14The grocery store data has information about category sales at different levels of aggregation. We
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actions for each bin, where the indicator Compi takes the value 1 for products in categories
that are sold by both chains. This allows us to identify separate effects across product
groups as measured by the βsb . In Table 2.14 we show the results.
consider an intermediate level of aggregation, which refers to categories such as ketchup, chocolate bars
and detergents.
67
Table 2.14: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0133
(0.0155)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0241**
(0.00937)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0263***
(0.00661)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0275***
(0.0101)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.000863
(0.00623)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0115***
(0.00189)















Clustered (by stores) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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In rows 11 to 15 in Table 2.14, we also calculate the gross effects for the competing
product categories and their respective standard errors.15
Separating competing and non-competing product categories, we find a similar pattern
as we did for all products overall: One-stop shopping increases the activity level, suggesting
that the extensive margin dominates. For other distance bins, the estimates are negative,
suggesting that the competition effect prevails if the stores cannot be reached from the same
parking area. The interaction-term-treatment parameters (βsb ) are negative and significant
for most of the bins, indicating that the competing products are more prone to competition
from the Europris stores. For instance, in the groups that have a new Eurpris store two
to five km away, the competition effect increases from -7.4% to -10.1%, a difference of 2.7
percentage points that is also highly significant. Additionally, we now find a negative and
significant parameter for the competing product categories for the distance bin ’250m-2km’
which is both bigger (-4.9%) and now significant, as opposed to what we found above for
all products. This is what we would intuitively anticipate: competition over products that
are offered by both the incumbent grocery store and the entering discount variety store is
expected to be higher.
Interestingly, the gross effect for one-stop shopping for the competing product categories
is not significant (though with a p-value equal to 0.116). On the other hand, the difference
parameter βsb for the ’same parking’ bin is only significant at a 5% level. Hence, in terms
of significance it is not obvious that the effect of co-location with common parking is much
different across the product groups. Actually, on a 1% level the models conclude that the
effect is the same for the two product groups.
In Figure 2.4 we illustrate how the effects on grocery weekly sales vary with distance
to the new Europris store for competing and non-competing product categories separately.
We observe an S-shaped pattern similar to the overall outcome (Figure 2.3).
15The estimates for the competing products categories are simply the sum of the interaction-term-
treatment parameters βsb and the treatment parameters βb.
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Figure 2.4: Illustration of estimated S-shape for competing and non-competing product
categories, (circles and diamonds illustrate significant estimates)
In Table 2.14, we look at all competing and non-competing product categories. To
explore the individual effects for some particularly relevant categories, we estimate the
model for product categories where the grocery chain and Europris clearly compete, and
for product categories where there is no competition. First, we estimate the effect for candy,
coffee and detergent, categories that are known to be important in the Europris product
portfolio, and where a number of strong national brands suggest that the products sold in
Europris and the grocery chain really do compete. The results are reported in Table 2.15
below.
70
Table 2.15: Log weekly sales
Candy Coffee Detergent
Same parking 0.0384 0.0840* 0.0575
(0.0963) (0.0500) (0.0641)
0.25km - 2km -0.158*** -0.00233 -0.124***
(0.0438) (0.0318) (0.0332)
2km-5km -0.198*** -0.115*** -0.181***
(0.0608) (0.0248) (0.0358)
5km-15km -0.177*** -0.0994** -0.159***
(0.0497) (0.0441) (0.0500)
More than 15km 0.127*** -0.0535** -0.0982**
(0.0339) (0.0258) (0.0443)
Store FE X X X
Week-year FE X X X
Control variables X X X
Control income X X X
N 32236 32298 32325
r2 0.817 0.636 0.833
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
We still find a positive agglomeration effect for same-parking establishments, though
only weakly significant for coffee. More noteworthy, we find much stronger competition
effects. Already for establishments as close as 0.25-2 km, we see strong competition effects
and for the second category (2-5 km), the competition effects are strong (between minus
12-20%) and significant for all three product groups. Turning now to product groups that
are not sold in Europris stores, we estimate the effect for bread, fresh chicken and milk,
and present the results in Table 2.16.
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Table 2.16: Log weekly sales
Bread Fresh chicken Milk
Same parking 0.103** 0.139** 0.118**
(0.0499) (0.0647) (0.0544)
0.25km - 2km -0.0229 -0.0267 -0.0159
(0.0246) (0.0361) (0.0284)
2km-5km -0.0837*** -0.0451* -0.0891***
(0.0281) (0.0268) (0.0217)
5km-15km -0.0111 -0.0426 -0.0131
(0.0274) (0.0344) (0.0102)
More than 15km -0.0434 0.0120 0.00308
(0.0488) (0.0311) (0.0161)
Store FE X X X
Week-year FE X X X
Control variables X X X
Control income X X X
N 32325 32322 32325
r2 0.882 0.859 0.878
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
The results from the overall regression in Table 2.14 are enhanced, the local agglomer-
ation effect now varies between 10 and 14%, as compared to 9% for the overall effect for
non-competing product categories in Table 2.14, but we still see evidence of a competition
effect from establishments further away.
2.4.3 Robustness
We perform two different exercises to make sure that our results are not biased by under-
lying dynamics in the treatment and control groups.
First, we take a closer look at how sales evolve over time in the treatment and control
stores prior to the treatment taking place. We plot average monthly sales in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Pre-trends in sales
The dashed line represents the average monthly sales in stores that never receive treat-
ment, while the solid line shows the average monthly sales in treatment stores that have not
yet received treatment. The trends in sales in the two groups share dynamics, suggesting
that the activity changes in the control and treatment groups have a common trend.
Second, since treatments occur at different times for different stores we choose to also
perform a Granger causality test. Following the approach used by Author (2003), we now
estimate:
ln(yti) = αi + λt + ηX it +
−1∑
τ=−2
ϕτDi1(t− T ∗i = τ) +
4∑
τ=0
φτDi1(t− T ∗i = τ) + εit
The binary indicator Di equals one if a store received treatment during the period we
consider. We interact Di with event-time dummies, 1(t − T ∗i = τ). The dummies take on
the value one when the time of observation (t) is τ ∈ [−2, 4] months from the treatment
month (T ∗i ). Earlier pre-months (t − T ∗i ≤ −2) serve as baseline. Observations more
than four months after a treatment are included through the dummy 1(t − T ∗i ≥ 4). The
coefficients on leads and lags of establishment are represented by ϕτ and φτ respectively.
If it is indeed the case that entries affect store activity, and not the other way around, we
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expect non-significant leads and significant lags. The results of the estimation are plotted
below in Figure 2.6.
(a) One stop (b) Two stops
Figure 2.6: Event study
Neither the one-stop results (Panel a) nor the two-stop results (Panel b) show significant
leads. This suggests that there are no anticipatory effects of establishments. In Panel a,
we notice a much higher and significant estimate in the month of establishment, which
is also sustained in the subsequent months. The lags provide evidence of increased store
activity in the post-periods. In Panel b, the lags are insignificant. Considering that we
found no significant treatment effect for half of the distance bins within two stops, this is
not surprising. Overall, the panels are consistent with what we observe in our econometric
analysis.
We undertake two additional sets of robustness tests. First we include stores that
have Europris entries in the vicinity but where it is unclear whether the entries reduce
the distance to the closest Europris store (refer Footnote 11). The results are presented
in Appendix A.3, Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6. Next, we re-estimate the models excluding our
control variables. These results are presented in Appendix A.4, Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.
Generally we get the same results for the whole set of models. There are some marginal
changes in significance levels but, generally, all our results are robust to these alternative
specifications and data sets.
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2.5 Extensive- and intensive margins: How to under-
stand co-location forces
2.5.1 A simple theory model
In the empirical analysis we find that whether the grocery store ends up being better or
worse off upon Europis’ entry depends on the distance between the two stores. We also find
a clear S-shaped pattern. The effect ultimately depends on the distance between the two
stores. If Europris ends up sufficiently close, the grocery store tends to benefit. In contrast,
an establishment that does not bring Europris close enough appears to be harmful. We
attribute these findings to the interplay between the extensive margin (increased localized
demand) and the intensive margin (fiercer competition and reduced purchases by existing
customers). In this section, we develop a simple theoretical example that shows how
decomposing the effect into an extensive and an intensive margin provides an intuitive
explanation of the results.
Suppose that the market is represented by a line that starts at 0 and ends at an indefinite
point. the grocery store is located at xG = 0. It sells n products at a common price p. The
customers are uniformly distributed at discrete intervals along the line. They value store
proximity, and face travel costs (t) that increase in distance to the grocery store. Hence,
the utility a customer located at x obtains from shopping at the grocery store is given by
uG = nv − tx− np
Where v is the customer’s gross willingness to pay per product. Note that the customers
only shop at the grocery store if the utility exceeds their reservation utility uR
16.
Pre Europris establishment
Consider first a market without a Europris store located close enough to affect the grocery
store’s demand. The consumer that is indifferent between shopping and not shopping at
the grocery store is located at
x̂ =
nv − np− uR
t
.
16The reservation utility reflects the attractiveness of the customers’ outside options, such as rival
grocery stores.
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The location of the grocery store and the indifferent consumer is illustrated in figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7: Pre establishment
The figure also shows that the grocery store’s demand before a Europris establishment
is given by
DG = x̂ =




Suppose then that Europris establishes a store at xE ∈ [0, x̂]. Europris offers one of the
products sold by the grocery store, but at a lower price αp, where α ∈ (0, 1). The utility
of just shopping at the grocery store is unchanged, but the customers might obtain an
additional value by purchasing the cheaper product from Europris. Visiting both stores
provides a utility equal to
uE,G = nv − (n− 1)p− αp− tx− t(xE − x)− F
for customers located at x ∈ (0, xE), and
uE,G = nv − (n− 1)p− αp− tx− F
for customers located at x > xE
17. The parameter F denotes the additional cost that
customers face if the stores cannot be visited in one stop, i.e., unless xE ≤ 250m. We find
that the location of the consumer that is indifferent between just shopping at the grocery
store and shopping at both the grocery store and Europris is given by




17These customers pass Europris on their way to the grocery store and no extra travel costs occur. We
assume that the customers do not care where on the way Europris is located, only about whether they
have to stop once or twice.
76
The shorter the distance between the grocery store and Europris, the more customers prefer
joint shopping. The customer that is indifferent between shopping at both stores and none
of them is located at
x̂′ =
nv − p(n− 1)− αp− uR − F
t
.
Consequently, customers that only shop at the grocery store are located to the left of x̃,
while customers who shop at both stores are located between x̂′ and x̃. Figure 2.8 outlines
the grocery store’s exclusive demand (DG) and shared demand (DE,G).
Figure 2.8: Post establishment
The extensive margin
For customers to the right of xE, the presence of Europris increases the utility of travelling
to the left on the line. As a result, some of the customers that previously did not shop
at the grocery store change their mind now that they can visit Europris during the same
trip. This effect is what we refer to as the extensive margin in response to a Europris
establishment. Graphically, the extensive margin is captured by x̂′ being located further
to the right than x̂. New grocery store customers are given by
x̂′ − x̂ = 1
t
(p(1− α)− F )
Since the new customers purchase (n− 1) products from the grocery store and 1 product
from Europris, the increase in the grocery store’s revenue equals
(x̂′ − x̂)p(n− 1)
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The intensive margin
After the Europris establishment, some of the customers who previously purchased all n
products from the grocery store decide to purchase the discounted product from Europris.
This response to the increased competition is called the intensive margin. For the grocery
store this effect is always negative as it implies lower demand. A comparison of figure 2.7
and figure 2.8 shows how the customers located between x̂ and x̃ went from being exclusive
grocery store customers to becoming shared customers in the wake of the establishment.
Formally, we have that
x̂− x̃ = nv − uR − p(n− 1)− αp− F
t
− xE
customers purchase less at the grocery store. This corresponds to a revenue loss equal to
(x̂− x̃)p
The total effect is simply the sum of the gained revenues due to the extensive margin and
the lost revenues due to the intensive margin.
2.5.2 Numerical illustration of the co-location forces
Figure 2.9 graphs the effect of a Europris establishment on the grocery store revenues.
It shows the effects from the extensive margin, the intensive margin and the total. The
parameter values are set to v = 1, t = 2, α = 0.5, n = 10, p = 0.75, uR = 0, 1 and F = 0.33
.
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Figure 2.9: Intensive vs extensive margin
Notice that the effect of the extensive margin is dominating when the distance between
Europris and the grocery store is short. There are two main reasons for this. First, the
customers do not have to make an additional stop to visit Europris, which attracts more
customers. Second, the gain from attracting a new customers is greater than the loss from
an exclusive customer turning into a shared customer. Recall that new customers purchase
(n − 1) products, while shared customers only purchase one product less than before the
Europris establishment. However, as the distance between the grocery store and Europris
increases, the effect of the intensive margin becomes dominant. When shopping at both
stores requires two stops, a Europris establishment might not attract sufficiently many
customers for the grocery store to benefit from it. Eventually, the competition effect also
fades out and the total effect approaches zero.
While the predictions from our modelling framework will be sensitive to the parameters
chosen, we do find in Figure 2.9 a very similar pattern to the S-shape observed in our
empirical analysis, as illustrated in, e.g., Figure 2.3. The observed and estimated S-shape
is thus consistent with a simple theoretical framework.
2.6 Conclusion
We analyze a number of entries and relocations by the Norwegian discount variety chain Eu-
ropris during the period 2016 to 2019. We measure how location choices affect local grocery
stores’ sales and traffic, using a diff-in-diff strategy and data from a large Norwegian grocery
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chain. We combine detailed data on travelling distance between new entries/relocations
and local grocery stores and data on local grocery store activity to measure the entry ef-
fects. The granularity of the data enables us to estimate separate effects for competing and
non-competing product categories.
We find significant effects from entries and relocations. Moreover, our findings suggest
an S-shaped relationship between distance and store activity; sufficiently close entries in-
crease local demand since more customers are attracted to the market, but as the distance
increases the competitive effect of a new discount variety store dominates, and local gro-
cery sales and traffic are reduced. As we move further away, the entry effect is gradually
reduced to zero. We show that this empirical finding can be squared with a simple location
theory model, showing a similar pattern.
When Europris is not locating very close to the grocery chain we consider, it could
possibly locate close to a rival grocery chain. This might obviously increase the rival grocery
chain’s attractiveness, and thus represent a negative competitive effect for our grocery
chain. Since we do not control for the neighbouring stores at Europris’ new location in our
analysis, this effect would be embedded in the negative competition effect we observe in
our data. If Europris locates near a rival, it would increase the value of the rival’s location
and shift more local demand towards the competing grocery store.
Most of the empirical literature accommodating local competition in retail markets
treats local competition as a linear effect: the closer a competitor is located, the fiercer
the competition (see e.g., Seim (2006) and Picone et al. (2009)). In line with existing
literature, we do find that a competitive effect is present, but our results also suggest that
this competition effect is dominated by a local and positive agglomeration effect leading to
more demand if the distance between stores stores is short enough. However, the agglom-
eration effect seems to be very local: as soon as the consumer needs to travel even short
distances between the stores, the agglomeration effect wears off and becomes dominated
by the negative competition effect.
Our results are clearly supporting some of the insights from theory, like Stahl’s (1982)
conjectures that depending on product overlap and demand heterogeneity co-location can
be positive. Moreover, our findings are in line with what others have found, such as
Vitorini (2012) who finds empirical support for firms co-locating despite potential business
stealing effects. Picone et al. (2009) find that co-location is more likely if the firms sell
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differentiated products. However, this does not necessarily imply that co-location requires
maximal differentiation. Our results suggest that even a relatively large product overlap is
compatible with co-location. We complement existing literature by providing evidence that
the net effect of agglomeration forces and competitive pressure depends on the distance
between the stores.
Our results also have relevance for the ongoing public discussion on store location poli-
cies in several countries. Some countries (e.g., Denmark and Sweden) have imposed local
competition regulations regarding new store locations to maximise local competition. Our
results seem to support the development of larger areas where several shops can be es-
tablished (e.g.in malls), sharing joint parking areas rather than regulating areas for single
store establishments. The stores can anticipate higher local demand, though they will be
exposed to a competitive effect from stores offering competing products. The first effect
is obviously positive to the retail firms. The latter effect is not, but it is positive for the
consumers.
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Appendix
A.1 Store number by distance category and treatment status







More than 15km 3
A.2 Store activity distance bins and treatment status
Table 2.2: Average weekly sales
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 1 196 403 -
Same parking 1 381.962 1 622 909 1 546.38 17.44 %
250m-2km 1 247.753 1 402 328 1 343.209 12.39 %
2km-5km 1 227.563 1 239 016 1 251.796 0.93 %
5km-15km 814 134 848 312 842 879 4.20 %
More than 15km 1 044 728 1 118 496 1 107 640 7.06 %
Table 2.3: Average weekly store traffic
Pre establishment Post establishment Overall Change
Control - - 5508.14 -
Same parking 6015.57 6552.26 6350.64 8.92 %
250m-2km 5214.69 5481.83 5490.48 5.12 %
2km-5km 5421.41 5189.43 5382.92 -4.28 %
5km-15km 3636.14 3665.31 3687.39 0.80 %
More than 15km 3586.40 3781.66 3778.39 5.44 %
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A.3 Include unclear treatment stores
Table 2.4: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.0948** 0.0600
(0.0441) (0.0367)
Two stops -0.0446*** -0.0405***
(0.0165) (0.0155)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 34835 34835
r2 0.844 0.847
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2.5: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.0951** 0.0604
(0.0441) (0.0367)






More than 15km -0.0180 -0.0114
(0.0142) (0.0225)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
N 34835 34835
r2 0.845 0.847
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0142
(0.0143)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0252***
(0.00855)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0228***
(0.00616)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0200**
(0.00843)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.00110
(0.00419)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0114***
(0.00183)















Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A.4 Without control variables
Table 2.7: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.100** 0.0632
(0.0474) (0.0398)
Two stops -0.0473** -0.0433**
(0.0194) (0.0177)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
N 34228 34228
r2 0.838 0.842
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p0¡0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2.8: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
Same parking 0.100** 0.0633
(0.0474) (0.0398)






More than 15km -0.0179 -0.0105
(0.0129) (0.0229)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
N 34228 34228
r2 0.838 0.842
Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.9: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0146
(0.0130)
Difference competing, same parking -0.0247***
(0.00945)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0249***
(0.00654)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0270***
(0.0100)
Difference competing, 5km-15km -0.00361
(0.00678)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0110***
(0.00201)














Clustered (by store) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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A.5 With income control variable
Table 2.10: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic
One stop 0.104** 0.0636
(0.0498) (0.0418)
Two stops -0.0376* -0.0372**
(0.0192) (0.0178)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
Control income X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Table 2.11: Effect of establishment by distance
Log weekly sales Log weekly store traffic








More than 15km -0.0203 -0.0132
(0.0157) (0.0245)
Store FE X X
Week-year FE X X
Control variables X X
Control income X X
N 32328 32328
r2 0.836 0.840
Clustered (store level) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.12: Effect of establishment by product heterogeneity and distance category (rows 11-
15 are gross estimates for the competing product categories calculated from the estimated
parameters in the model)
Log weekly sales








Non-competing, More than 15km -0.0165
(0.0158)
Difference competings, same parking -0.0241**
(0.00937)
Difference competing, 250m-2km -0.0263***
(0.00661)
Difference competing, 2km-5km -0.0275***
(0.0101)
Difference competing, 5km-15km 0.000863
(0.00623)
Difference competing, More than 15km -0.0115***
(0.00189)
















Clustered (by stores) standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Chapter 3
Size-based input price discrimination
under endogenous inside options
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Abstract
Individual retailers may choose to invest in a substitute to a dominant supplier’s product
(inside option) as a way of improving their position towards the supplier. If there are
transactional economies of scale, a large retailer has stronger investment incentives than
a smaller rival, and may be in a position to obtain a selective rebate (size-based price
discrimination). Yet, we often observe that dominant suppliers do not charge small retailers
more than large retailers. We argue that the reason for this is that the suppliers could
be better off by committing to charge a uniform price and thereby affect the retailers’
investment incentives. In this regard, the competitive pressure among the retailers plays a
role: The more fiercely the retailers compete, the more each retailer cares about relative
input prices. Other things equal, this implies that the retailers will invest more in the
substitute the greater the competitive pressure. We show that if the competitive pressure
is sufficiently strong, the supplier can profitably incentivize the large retailer to reduce its
investments by committing to charge a uniform input price. Finally, we show that under
uniform input pricing, the large retailer may induce smaller rivals to exit the market by
strategically under-investing in inside options.
Keywords: Input price discrimination, size asymmetries, retail competition, inside options,
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3.1 Introduction
Size-based input price discrimination in favor of large retailers is an age-old issue. Wal-
mart’s success, for instance, has partly been explained by its size leading to advantageous
input prices (see e.g. Basker, 2007; Ellickson, 2016; Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan, 2006); a
ten percent increase in volume reduces Walmart’s marginal upstream costs by two percent
(Basker, 2007). Likewise, Amazon exploits its power as a large retailer to obtain low input
prices in the book publishing market (Gilbert, 2015). In the US multi-channel TV market,
the per customer input prices for a large firm like Comcast could be 25 percent lower than
those faced by smaller firms (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Doudchenko and Yurukoglu,
2016). The UK competition authorities found a significant negative relationship between
size in grocery retailing and unit input prices (Competition Commission, 2008). In 2019,
the Norwegian Competition Authority (2019) made a comprehensive study of input prices
in the grocery market; from some dominant suppliers, the largest retail chain obtains a
selective rebate of more than 15 percent compared to the smaller rivals.1 These examples
indicate that input price discrimination takes place in a large array of industries. The aim
of this paper is to shed some new light on why suppliers price discriminate, and to analyze
in what situations the supplier might be better off if it could commit not to discriminate.
Suppliers cannot price discriminate unless they have some market power, but it is far
from obvious why a supplier with market power should want to let input prices depend on
the size of the respective buyer (hereafter labeled retailer). In the public debate, the typical
story used to explain size-based input price discrimination is that it is more costly for the
supplier to lose a contract with a large retailer than with a small retailer.2 This strengthens
the bargaining position of large retailers. The problem with this story, is that it neglects
the fact that it is also more costly for a large than for a small retailer to lose the contract
with the supplier. This strengthens the bargaining position of the supplier towards large
retailers. Katz (1987) shows that these effects exactly offset each other whenever size is
1The Norwegian Competition Authority (2019) confirms that the revealed price discrimination favored
the largest chain on the margin, and the competition authority has started an investigation towards the
largest chain and two dominant suppliers. Analogously, the investigation of the UK grocery market by
the Competition Commission (2008, Appendix 5.3) found that “an increase in the volumes purchased by
a retailer or wholesaler is associated with a reduction in both the unit and net price paid.”
2This claim was given support by Galbraith’s concept of countervailing buyer power (Galbraith, 1952).
However, Galbraith offers no formal model, and Stigler (1954) was criticizing Galbraith for formulating a
dogma rather than a theory. See also von Ungern-Sternberg (1996).
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the only difference between the retailers; there will be no price discrimination.3
Having established this, Katz (1987) then assumes that large retailers have better access
to an alternative source of supply than do small retailers; if this is the case, price discrim-
ination might evolve in favor of large retailers.4 Put differently, size-based input price
discrimination arises if there are what Katz (1987) labels transactional economies of scale
in acquiring an alternative source, such that a large retailer’s threat to leave (completely
or partly) is stronger than that of smaller retailers.5
To prove this formally, Katz (1987) considers a game where the supplier at stage one sets
input prices. At stage two, each retailer either accepts the input price he is offered or invests
in an alternative source of supply. This constitutes an outside option since the retailers
have not made any investments at the time when input prices are determined. Because
the retailers’ ability to cover the investment costs increases in output, large retailers have
stronger investment incentives than small retailers. To prevent the retailers from making
such investments on stage two, the supplier offers large retailers a selective rebate on stage
one. If the retailers compete in the output market, the large retailers will gain a competitive
advantage due to their lower input prices.
In this setting, the supplier will lose profit if it does not price discriminate. To see
why, assume that the supplier is obliged by law to charge a common uniform price to all
retailers. To keep every retailer aboard, the supplier must reduce all input prices – even
those paid by the largest buyers. The fact that uniform pricing prevents the supplier from
providing selective rebates to large retailers does not remove the large retailers’ threats of
investing in the outside option. On the contrary, the threats become stronger; the supplier
cannot favor large retailers with lower input prices than those offered to their competitors.
To compensate for the lost competitive advantage, the supplier must offer the large retailer
3Katz (1987) assumes that the supplier can make take-it-or-leave-it offers. Inderst and Montez (2019)
and Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2018) verify that the result holds also if input prices are determined through
bargaining processes between the supplier and each retailer.
4Large retailers may also achieve a rebate compared to smaller ones if the supplier faces increasing
marginal costs in the relevant area (Chipty and Snyder, 1999, and subsequent papers). More precisely, in
the set-up of Chipty and Snyder (1999), the larger retailer realizes a size advantage given that the gross
surplus function created by the transaction between the supplier and the retailer is concave.
5As Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016) emphasize in their example of multi-channel television, a large
firm as Google does not benefit from any size effect, since it has not enough subscribers in that particular
market (i.e., scale). Comcast, in contrast, has a large enough audience to threaten with an alternative
source of content supply, which it can also activate at a lower cost than Google. In this example, Comcast
has a size advantage that is enabled through transactional economies of scale.
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a lower input price. The reduced input prices in turn translate into lower consumer prices,
but the supplier is clearly harmed.
Katz (1987) obviously captures important aspects of the relationship between retailers
and suppliers. However, there is reason to question the robustness of the prediction that a
supplier necessarily prefers to price discriminate. As an example, we observe that digital
platforms like Apple and Google commit to a non-discriminatory 30/70 split of revenues
with content providers.6 Another example is the use of most-favored customer clauses
between suppliers and retailers to ensure that small and large buyers pay identical input
prices. Our main research question is therefore: Could commitment to uniform pricing
be an optimal strategy for a supplier if transactional economies of scale would otherwise
generate price discrimination?
The answer is yes. To show this, we set up a simple model where a retailer prior
to the determination of the dominant supplier’s input prices, may choose to invest in an
alternative source of supply, which for concreteness we may call a private label. The more
the retailer invests, the lower the marginal cost of producing the private label. In the words
of O’Brien (2014), the retailer has an inside option (as opposed to an outside option as in
Katz, where investments are made after the price decision) which it may use to press down
the input price charged by the supplier. Now, suppose that there are several retailers and
that the consumers perceive them as close substitutes. The retailers then compete fiercely,
and it is important for each to gain a competitive advantage over its rivals. This business-
stealing motivation results in high investments in the inside option, which is bad for the
supplier, who is forced to set low input prices. So, what would happen if the supplier could
commit to charging the same input price to all retailers (i.e. uniform pricing)? First, we
observe that, all else equal, the supplier is worse off by such a commitment, since it would
ex-post prefer to charge the small retailer a higher price, i.e. to price discriminate. So, how
could the supplier possibly be better off with a commitment to uniform pricing? To answer
this, note that when facing uniform prices, no retailer can any longer obtain a competitive
advantage by putting pressure on the supplier’s input price. The commitment thus affects
the retailers’ investment incentives (ex ante), which are reduced. That allows the supplier
to raise the price, and a commitment to uniform prices could therefore be profitable for the
6Apple uses this split independent of whether the decision on retail pricing is delegated (the agency
model used for e-books and apps) or whether Apple decides the retail price (the wholesale model used for
music in iTunes). See e.g. Gilbert (2015) and Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2017).
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supplier. The more substitutable the retailers are for the consumers, the higher is the price
increase, and the more profitable is the commitment decision. Since higher input prices
translate into higher retail prices, the consumers will be harmed.
It is not always profitable for the supplier to commit to uniform pricing. This is most
clearly seen if we assume that the retailers do not compete at all; there is then no business-
stealing motivation of investing in the inside option, and the investment level of the largest
retailer will then be independent of whether the supplier price discriminates. If the supplier
uses uniform pricing in such a case, the only effect will be that it must charge lower input
prices from smaller retailers, which clearly would harm the supplier, but be advantageous
for the consumers. This result holds also if the competitive pressure between the retailers
is relatively weak. Consequently, the supplier and the consumers have conflicting interests
both with weak and strong retail competition.
In the spirit of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and subsequent papers on strategic
R&D investments, we allow for investment spillovers between the retailers. We show that if
the supplier price discriminates, and the investment spillover is not too strong, each retailer
will strategically over-invest in the inside option to gain a competitive advantage. Under
uniform pricing, on the other hand, higher investments by the large retailer will always
benefit the small retailers, and the retailers will therefore under-invest in inside options
in order to constrain output and increase prices. Strategic over- or under-investments
could be used to deter competitors from the industry. This papers contributes with insight
on this topic. More precisely, we apply our finding to consider how a large retailer may
strategically invest to induce exit (or prevent entry) of smaller rivals.
The concern that input price discrimination causes exit and prevents entry goes back
to the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936. We find that if the supplier commits to uniform
pricing, the large retailer may induce exit or prevent entry by under-investing in the inside
option.7 The opposite is true under price discrimination unless investment spillovers are
sufficiently strong.
7Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016) empirically quantify how bargaining power related to size affects
the analysis of mergers and the profitability of entrants in the US multi-channel TV market. As mentioned
above, they estimate that Comcast manages to negotiate about 25 percent lower unit input prices for
content than smaller rivals.
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3.2 Literature review
As explained above, in contrast to our model, the source of size-based price discrimination
in the seminal paper by Katz (1987) is that outside options are available after the input
prices are determined. Under uniform pricing, the supplier cannot provide a selective rebate
to the large retailer, but the large retailer’s bargaining power from the threat of using the
outside option does not disappear. Consequently, the supplier offers a lower input price to
all retailers to ensure that the large retailer stays on board.8 Consumer prices are reduced.
Since no investments take place, total welfare unambiguously increases if the supplier uses
uniform pricing. However, since the supplier is worse off under uniform pricing, the supplier
does not want to commit to uniform pricing under binding outside options.
O’Brien (2014) and Akgün and Chioveanu (2019) assume that price discrimination arises
due to asymmetries in inside options among the retailers. O’Brien shows that average
input prices are typically higher if the supplier cannot use price discrimination. In this
case, consumer surplus tends to be higher under price discrimination (in contrast to Katz,
1987). Akgün and Chioveanu (2019) have a model with the same basic mechanisms as
ours, but they do not consider differences in size between retailers. More specifically, they
assume that the retailers can invest in reducing the cost of accessing a substitute that is
offered by a competitive fringe. Their focus is on how a ban on price discrimination affects
retailers’ innovation incentives, and whether such a ban tends to favor more efficient or
more inefficient retailers.
All other things equal, a retailer with lower marginal costs at the retail level has a
larger market share than a less efficient rival. However, such asymmetries in retail effi-
ciency cannot explain size-based price discrimination in favor of the large retailer. Quite
the opposite; DeGraba (1990) and Katz (1987) show that an unconstrained supplier will
price discriminate in favor of the less efficient retailer.9 If the retailers can invest prior to
8In the basic model, Katz (1987) assumes that only the large retailer can invest in the outside option,
but in the appendix, he shows that the results hold also when the small retailers can invest in outside
options. Katz considers the case where the retailers need to undertake a fixed cost investment to get access
to the outside option. The qualitative results are not affected if the retailers instead make investments
that reduce the marginal costs. The latter case reflects our model, except for the difference in timing as
investments take place after the decision on input prices. See Appendix A.4.
9Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan (2006) show the opposite in a bargaining framework. If a large retailer
has lower retail marginal costs, there is a potential gain from transferring sales to the more efficient retailer,
thus increasing channel profit. Under bargaining, the supplier captures some of the gain from enhanced
efficiency. Using the insight that more complex contracts facilitate price discrimination, Inderst and Shaffer
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the decision on input prices to reduce retail marginal costs, DeGraba (1990) shows that
retailers invest less under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. The reason is
that the more a retailer invests in retail marginal cost reductions, the greater the level
of price discrimination in disfavor of the more efficient, and consequently larger, retailer.
In our setup, we deliberately assume that retailers are equally efficient at the retail level.
Consequently, differences in retail marginal costs are not a source of price discrimination
in our model.
Inderst and Valletti (2009) combine elements from DeGraba (1990) and Katz (1987).
Like DeGraba, they allow retailers to invest in retail marginal cost reductions prior to the
supplier’s choice of input prices. Like in Katz, retailers may invest in an outside option after
input prices are determined, and the threat of using the outside option is more credible
for a large than for a small retailer. In contrast to DeGraba (1990), Inderst and Valletti
(2009) show that retailers may invest more in retail marginal cost reductions under price
discrimination than under uniform pricing.
Like all the above-mentioned papers, we consider linear input pricing. While real-world
contracts typically involve more than a simple unit input price, linear input pricing seems to
be a more reasonable assumption than non-linear contracts in many markets. One example
is grocery retailing. Even though the contracts between suppliers and retailers are complex,
comprehensive investigations by competition authorities in the UK and Norway (Compe-
tition Commission, 2008; Norwegian Competition Authority, 2019) reveal that rebates are
given at the margin and that (average) variable input price components are decreasing
in size (see also discussion by Inderst and Valletti, 2009). Linear input price contracts
are also widely used in cable-TV markets (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Crawford et
al., 2018; Doudchenko and Yurukoglu, 2016) and in the book publishing industry (see e.g.
Gilbert, 2015). Further examples are provided by Gaudin (2019). Iyer and Villas-Boas
(2003) provide a theoretical rationale for using linear input pricing.10
(2009) show that the more efficient firm obtains the lowest price when the supplier offer two-part tariff
contracts. This result arises from the ability of non-linear contracts to extract downstream surplus and
incentivize allocative efficiency.
10Under non-linear pricing it is crucial whether wholesale contracts are secret or not. Under secret
contracts, O’Brien and Shaffer (1992; 1994) show that there will be no price discrimination at the margin
from an unconstrained supplier. Instead, input prices at the margin equal the supplier’s marginal cost.
In contrast to the outcome under non-linear pricing, Gaudin (2019) shows that consumer prices may be
higher under secret than observable (and credible) linear input prices. Most of the papers on input price
discrimination under non-linear contracts assume an unconstrained supplier. One exception is Inderst and
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3.3 The model
We consider a context with n ≥ 2 intrinsically identical and independent local markets. In
each market there is a ‘small’ retailer, S, which only operates locally (nS = 1). In nL ≤ n
of the markets there also exists a ‘large’ retailer, L. The large retailer has one outlet in
each of the markets where it is present. We assume that nL ≥ 2.
A dominant upstream supplier U offers each retailer a good that it can resell to the
consumers. If retailer i buys the good, it is charged a unit input price wi (i = L, S) by
the supplier. Retailers are equally efficient with respect to retail costs. For simplicity, we
normalize retailing costs to zero. Hence, asymmetries in retailing costs are not a source of
input price discrimination in our model. Operating profit per retail outlet is then equal to
(pi − wi)qi, where pi is the consumer price and qi is output.
Rather than buy from the supplier, retailer i can produce a substitutable good in-house
if it has previously made an adequate investment: in the words of O’Brien (2014), the
retailer has an inside option. Let oi denote the marginal cost of producing this inside option.
The more the retailer has invested in the manufacturing process, the lower its marginal
production cost oi.
11 In the spirit of the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) on strategic R&D investments, we open up for the possibility that a retailer which
invests in the production of an inside option, may generate positive side effects for the
other retailer in the same market (e.g., due to knowledge spillovers concerning production
technologies or – in a richer model – greater acceptance of e.g. private labels).
Hence, we assume that the marginal cost of producing the inside option is
oi = 1− (xi + θxj) , where i, j = L, S; i 6= j. (3.1)
The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] in equation (3.1) reflects investment spillovers. There are no
spillovers if θ = 0, and perfect spillovers if θ = 1.12
Shaffer (2019). They show that if retailers have access to outside options, the supplier may reduce the unit
input price, and increase the fixed slotting fee, towards one of the retailers, and thereby reduce the value
of the outside options for all other retailers.
11In grocery markets, among others, one interpretation may be investments in the ability to offer
private labels. We could also envisage that each retailer makes investments that increase the consumers’
willingness to pay for the private label (e.g., through marketing and quality improvements). The model
becomes rather complex if we consider both cost-reducing and value-enhancing investments. To make our
points as transparent as possible, we abstract from the latter and assume that the consumers perceive the
inside option to be equally good as the original good offered by the dominant supplier.
12In (3.1) we have implicitly that the spillovers to the large retailer are independent of how many
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The cost of investing xi is C(xi), where C is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Since the inside option and the original good are perfect substitutes, retailer i will sell the
one which has the lower marginal cost. Defining zi = min {wi, oi}, we can write net profit
of a representative small retailer and the large retailer, respectively, as
πS = (pS − zS)qS − C(xS) and (3.2)
ΠL =
nL∑
(pL − zL)qL − C(xL). (3.3)
In each local market, consumer preferences are defined by a Shubik-Levitan (1980)
utility function:13





where s ∈ [0, 1] reflects the degree of differentiation between the outlets. Specifically, the
consumers perceive the large and the small retailers in a given market as perfect substitutes
if s = 1 and as unrelated if s = 0. By allowing imperfect substitutes, s ∈ (0, 1), we analyze
a greater variety of market competition than most existing literature.
Consumer surplus in a representative market is given by
CS = Ψ(qL, qS)− pLqL − pSqS. (3.5)
Solving ∂CS/∂qi = 0, we find the inverse demand functions
pi = 2− (1− s)2qi − s(qL + qS). (3.6)
Below, we consider a game with the following timing in each of the n identical markets:
• Stage 1: The retailers decide how much to invest in the inside option (L and S choose
xL and xS, respectively). This determines oL and oS.
local markets it operates in. This seems technically reasonable, since the local retailers are identical and
consequently make identical technological choices. An alternative specification of the spillover function
would be to set oL = 1 − (xL + θnLxS) . This would presumably enhance the advantage of operating in
several locations (greater economies of scale), but not change the qualitative results.
13The demand system by Shubik and Levitan (1980) has an attractive property, since we may vary
the degree of substitution among retailers without affecting the size of the market (see e.g. discussion by
Inderst and Shaffer, 2019).
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• Stage 2: The supplier sets the input prices wL and wS that maximize own profit,
taking into account the fact that retailer i = L, S will buy the good only if wi ≤ oi.
• Stage 3: L and S decide qL and qS, where their marginal costs are given by zL =
min {wL, oL} and zS = min {wS, oS}, respectively.
The game is solved by backward induction.
3.3.1 Stage 3: Output
At stage 3, the retailers choose their profit-maximizing output. Solving ∂πi/∂qi = 0, the






qi + (pi − zi) = 0. (3.7)
This implies that
qi =
2 (4− 3s)− 2 (2− s) zi + szj
(4− s) (4− 3s)
. (3.8)
3.3.2 Stage 2: The supplier chooses input prices
At stage 2, the supplier offers retailer i the upstream good at price wi. We normalize all
costs for the upstream firm to zero, so that its profit level is given by:
u = wLqL + wSqS. (3.9)




wL = wS = ŵ = 1.
Our interest is in the case where retailer i has invested in an adequate inside option,
such that oi < ŵ. This means that retailer i
′s cost of using the inside option is a binding
constraint for the upstream firm; the retailer will not buy from the supplier unless wi ≤
oi < ŵ.
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3.3.3 Stage 1: Investments by the retailers
Let us now turn to stage 1, where the retailers decide how much to invest in the inside

























The first square bracket of equation (3.10) measures the direct effect of investing in
the inside option. The term (−qSdzS/dxS) captures the fact that by increasing xS by one
unit, the production cost for the inside good falls by dzS/dxS units for each of the qS
units the retailer sells. Other things equal, it is optimal to invest in the inside option until
this marginal benefit is equal to marginal investment costs, C ′(xS). The second square
bracket measures the strategic effect of investing in the inside option: since an increase in
xS reduces marginal production costs for the small retailer, the large retailer will respond
by changing its output (dqL/dxS). This, in turn, affects the price that the small retailer can
charge (∂pS/∂qL < 0). Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988), we say
that the small retailer will strategically over-invest if the second square bracket is positive
(which is true if dqL/dxS < 0), while it will strategically under-invest if the bracket is
negative (which is true if dqL/dxS > 0). We will analyze this in detail below.


























All else equal, investing in more efficient production technology is more profitable for
the large retailer; it benefits from lower marginal costs in all the locations in which it
operates. Both the direct and the strategic effect of investing are therefore greater for the
large retailer than for each of the small retailers, other things equal.
All markets are identical, and it is convenient to define the large retailer’s profit in each
market where it operates as πL = ΠL/nL. This allows us to write the first-order condition























= 0, (i = L, S), (3.12)
where ni = 1 for i = S and ni = nL for i = L. Below, we will discuss when this first-order
condition constitutes an optimum.
Input price discrimination (PD)
Let us start out by asking whether the supplier has incentives to price discriminate, i.e. to
charge different prices from the large and the small retailers. To answer this question, we
can use equation (3.12) to see how the investment incentives for the large and the small


















Equation (3.13) shows that the larger is the large retailer, the more it invests in the
inside good. The size of the large retailer does not directly affect the investment incentives
of the small retailers, but it could, nonetheless, have an indirect effect. However, stability
requires that |dxi/dxj| < 1. Since lower costs of producing the inside good force the
upstream firm to charge a lower price for the original good, we can conclude:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the supplier can price discriminate:
(i) The supplier charges a higher input price to the small retailers than from the large
retailer (zS > zL), and
(ii) more so the larger the size difference between the retailers (d(zS − dzL)/dnL > 0).
The mechanism behind the result in the first part of Lemma 1 corresponds to Akgün
and Chioveanu (2019). They show that a retailer with lower marginal cost of using the
inside option, faces a lower input price. O’Brien (2014) shows in a bargaining framework
that a retailer with better inside options than its rival, obtains a lower input price, but
O’Brien does not model how asymmetries in inside options may arise. We show that this
effect follows from exogenous differences in size between the retailers. Therefore, the ability
to invest in inside options may explain size-based input price discrimination in favor of the
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large retailer, and that the degree of price discrimination is increasing in the size difference
between the retailers.
While market players and policy makers often claim that input price discrimination is
size-based, the literature only provides economies of scale with respect to outside options
(Katz, 1987) and increasing marginal costs at the supplier level (Chipty and Snyder, 1999)
as potential explanations for size-based price discrimination. Long-run investment in inside
options may be an alternative explanation, and seems to be consistent with the observations
that retailers in many industries undertake significant cost-reducing and value-enhancing
investments regarding the ability to provide private labels and backward integrate (for
further discussion, see the Concluding Remarks).
Let us now investigate how the investment incentives depend on the investment spillovers.













dxi︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
>0 if θ>0
(3.14)
The more firm i invests in the inside option, the lower its marginal costs (dzi/dxi =
−1). Other things equal, an increase in xi thus makes the local rival less competitive and
induces it to produce less. This is captured by the first term in equation (3.14), which
is consequently negative. However, if there are positive investment spillovers, a higher
investment by firm i reduces marginal costs also for firm j (dzj/dxi = −θ). In isolation,
this tends to increase output from firm j, making the second term in equation (3.14) positive










, where θPD ≡ s
4− 2s
. (3.15)
If the spillovers are sufficiently strong, θ > θPD, we consequently see that firm j’s
output is increasing in the investment level of firm i. Using equation (3.6), which implies
that ∂pi/∂qj = −s (the negative price effect of greater output from the rival is larger the
better substitutes the retailers sell), it follows that the sign of the strategic effect depends












qi < 0 if θ > θ
PD. (3.16)
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Let us next investigate how one retailer’s investment incentives depend on the invest-





4 (2− s)2 (4− 2s− sθ)




> 0 if θ > θPD, (3.17)
which shows that investments are strategic complements if θ > θPD and strategic substi-
tutes if θ < θPD.
We can now state:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the supplier price discriminates, and that
(i) θ < θPD. Each retailer will strategically over-invest in the inside option. Investments
are strategic substitutes.
(ii) θ > θPD. Each retailer will strategically under-invest in the inside option. Invest-
ments are strategic complements.
Figure 3.1 shows how the sign of the strategic effect depends on spillovers and the
substitutability between the large and the small retailer in each market. Each retailer wants
the rival to produce less. In the figure, this implies that each retailer will over-invest below
the upward-sloping line (dqj/dxi|θ<θPD < 0) and under-invest above it (dqj/dxi|θ>θPD > 0).
Figure 3.1: Strategic investment behavior.
Equation (3.13) tells us that an increase in nL has a positive effect on xL, but only an
indirect effect on xS. The sign of the indirect effect depends on the size of the spillovers,
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which determines whether investments are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
More precisely, from Proposition 1, we can deduce:
Corollary 1 The small retailers’ investment in inside options is
a) decreasing in the size of the large retailer (dxS/dnL < 0) if θ < θ
PD.
b) increasing in the size of the large retailer (dxS/dnL > 0) if θ > θ
PD.
Uniform pricing (UP)
Now, assume that the upstream supplier does not price discriminate between the large and
the small retailers, but rather sets a common wL = wS = w. At this stage, we will not
discuss why it sets a uniform price; it could be due to competition policy. However, we
shall also see that the supplier may be better off if it does not price discriminate.
It follows from the analysis above that the large retailer has stronger incentives than
the small one to invest in the inside option (this is true independent of whether the supplier
price discriminates). The supplier will therefore be able to sell to both types of retailers
only if it sets w ≤ oL. In an equilibrium where the supplier serves the whole market, we
therefore have
w = 1− (xL + θxS). (3.18)
Inserting for this into (3.8), output at stage three can be written as




The marginal direct benefit for the large firm of investing in the inside option is the
same as when the supplier price discriminates; it reduces the per-unit input price from the
supplier by one unit (dwi/dxL = −1). The disadvantage for the large retailer is that the
lower input price now also applies for each of the local rivals, which respond by increasing
output (dqS/dxL = 1/(4 − s)). The large retailer will therefore strategically under-invest.


































Since ∂πS/∂xS|xS=0 = θqS
2(2−s)
4−s − C
′ > 0 if C ′(0) is not too steep, it is optimal for the
small retailers to invest if θ > 0 (for simplicity, we have assumed that there are no fixed
costs involved in investing in the inside option). The small retailers have no incentives to















In contrast to what we found under price discrimination, investments are now always
strategic complements.
We can conclude:
Proposition 2 Assume uniform pricing and that θ > 0. All retailers will strategically
under-invest in inside options. Investments are strategic complements.
3.4 Comparison of input price discrimination and uni-
form pricing
3.4.1 Inducing exit (or preventing entry)
So far, we have looked at the question of whether the retailers have incentives to over-invest
or under-invest in the inside option, given that the rival(s) will remain in the market.
In the public debate, much attention has been given to the question of whether price
discrimination in favor of large retailers prevents entry or, analogously, induces exit of
smaller rivals. In our framework, will the large retailer have incentives to strategically
over-invest in the inside option in order to reduce the profitability of the small retailers?
This could induce exit if the retailers e.g. have fixed operating costs that they need to
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cover. To answer this question, we must examine how the large retailer’s investment level
affects profit for a small rival (i.e. not only the large retailer’s own profit, which we looked
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The more the large retailer invests in the inside option, the more it will sell (because the
supplier will be forced to charge a lower input price). This will harm the small retailers if
s > 0, and explains why the first term in the square bracket of equation (3.20) is negative.
The second term, however, is positive if there are positive spillovers, such that the small
retailers’ marginal costs are decreasing in the large retailer’s investment level. Whether the











If θ < θPD, we thus have dπS
dxL
< 0. In this case, the large retailer can induce exit or
prevent entry by over-investing in the inside option.
If the supplier does not price discriminate, higher investments by the large retailer will




If the large retailer wants to induce exit under uniform pricing, it will therefore under-
invest in inside options.
We can state:
Proposition 3 Under uniform pricing, the large retailer may induce exit (prevent entry)
by under-investing in the inside option. The opposite is true under price discrimination,
unless spillovers are sufficiently strong (θ > θPD).
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3.4.2 Who benefits from uniform pricing (and who benefits from
price discrimination)?
Henceforth, we abstract from entry and exit decisions, and we ask who is better off under
price discrimination and who is better off under uniform pricing? We show that the degree
of competition among retailers has critical impact on the answer to this question.
If there are perfect spillovers (θ = 1), the costs of using the inside option will be the same
for all the retailers. Then, their investment levels do not depend on whether the supplier in
principle is able to price discriminate; the uniform pricing and price discrimination regimes
are identical. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the opposite extreme, and set θ = 0.
We will then analyze how the differences between the price discrimination and the uniform
pricing regimes depend on the competitive pressure among the retailers, as measured by the
substitutability parameter s. In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we further assume
the simple quadratic investment cost function, C(xi) = (γ/2)x
2
i . Our interest is in stable
equilibria where both the large and the small retailers are operative and, in Appendix A.1,
we show that all the necessary conditions for the existence of such equilibria are satisfied
if γ ≥ 8 and nL < 6. We therefore set C(xi) = 4x2i and let nL ∈ [2, 6).
Consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes (s = 1)
As a starting point, assume that the consumers perceive the large and the small retailers
to be perfect substitutes (s = 1). The large retailer invests more in the inside option than
any of its competitors, and will therefore be charged a lower input price by the supplier if







; wPDS − wPDL > 0. (3.21)
All calculations in this section are shown in Appendix A.2. The more outlets the large
retailer has, the more it will invest in the inside option and the less will it be charged by
the supplier (dwPDL /dnL < 0). This means that the competitiveness of the small retailers
is decreasing in nL, so that their marginal profitability of investing in the inside option
is also decreasing in nL. This, in turn, allows the supplier to charge them an input price
which is increasing in nL (dw
PD
S /dnL > 0).
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=> πPDS − πPDL < 0. (3.22)
Since the input price for the large retailer is decreasing in its number of outlets, its
profit level is increasing in nL (dπ
PD
L /dnL > 0), while the opposite is true for the small
retailers (dπPDS /dnL < 0). Not surprisingly, profit per outlet is greater for the large than
for the small retailers. We further find that consumer surplus and the profit level for the





60 (6− nL) (17− nL)
(96− 11nL)2
. (3.23)
Equation (3.23) implies that dCSPD/dnL > 0 and du
PD/dnL < 0. This simply reflects
the fact that the direct effect of the large retailer increasing its size is that the supplier is
forced to charge a lower input price to the large retailer, which partly spills over to lower
consumer prices from the large retailer. This effect dominates over the indirect effect that
the small retailers can be charged a somewhat higher input price if nL increases (so that
consumer prices from the small retailers increase).





As expected, we find dwUP/dnL < 0; the large retailer invests more in the inside option
the more locations it operates in, and thereby forcing the supplier to charge a lower price.
In Appendix A.2, we show that joint profit for the nL outlets of the large retailer is
greater than the profit level of a representative local competitor (nLπ
UP
L − πUPS > 0).
However, an interesting difference from the price discrimination case is that since the small
retailers can now free-ride on the investments undertaken by the large retailer, the large












It is straight forward to show that wPDL < w
UP < wPDS ; the uniform input price lies
between the low input price that the large retailer would otherwise pay and the high
input price faced by the local retailers. This corresponds to the findings by Akgün and
Chioveanu (2019).14 The large retailer will consequently have to pay a higher input price
under uniform pricing, and its competitive advantage over the small retailers erodes. For
the same reason, a uniform price is unambiguously good for the small retailers; they will
become more competitive, and also pay a lower input price.








In parallel to the results above, we have dCSUP/dnL > 0 and du
UP/dnL < 0. More in-
terestingly, from equations (3.23) and (3.26), we find that uUP > uPD. The supplier is thus
better off if it charges the same price to each of the retailers than if it price discriminates.
The difference is, moreover, increasing in nL. The intuition for why it is advantageous for
the supplier not to price discriminate, is that the large retailer will then have less incentives
to invest in the inside option, since it cannot obtain any competitive advantage. The sup-
plier can therefore charge a higher input price to the large retailer under uniform pricing
than under price discrimination (wUP > wPDL ). The higher input price is partly passed on
to the consumers, and from equations (3.23) and (3.26), it follows that CSUP < CSPD.
Other things equal, it is a dominant strategy for the supplier to price discriminate at
stage two of the game if the retailers differ in their investments in inside options. Unless
the supplier can credibly commit to uniform pricing before the retailers invest, we will
therefore have a unique equilibrium where the supplier price discriminates.
Proposition 4 Assume that the consumers perceive the large retailer and the small retail-
ers as perfect substitutes. The supplier will then commit to uniform pricing if it is able to
do so, and this will harm the consumers.
As discussed in the Introduction, competition policy might require dominant suppliers
to not price discriminate. This could solve the commitment problem for the supplier.
Indeed, even if competition authorities do not actively pursue the non-discrimination policy,
14As emphasized above, they do not consider differences in size among the retailers, but assume that
one of the retailers may be more efficient with respect to investments in inside alternatives.
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one might imagine that the supplier could appeal to the competition law to signal that it
cannot price discriminate. An alternative device for committing to uniform pricing, is
through a price-parity clause with at least one of the retailers in each market. When
retailers’ products are perfect substitutes, both the supplier and the small retailers in each
market prefer uniform pricing. Consequently, they all benefit from such a clause.
It is interesting to compare the results above with those of Katz (1987), who assumes
s = 1. A retailer can credibly threaten to ex post invest in an outside option (e.g. backward
integration) unless the supplier charges a sufficiently low input price. As in our model, a
large retailer has greater incentives than smaller retailers to invest in an alternative source
of supply due to economies of scale. Katz derives conditions under which none of the firms
will actually invest in the outside option. He finds that under reasonable assumptions,
uniform pricing (e.g. due to a ban on price discrimination) can lower the input prices that
the supplier charges from both the large and the small retailers. Consumer prices will then
unambiguously fall, in contrast to what we find.
Before we leave the comparison with Katz (1987) for now, we note that welfare under
price discrimination and welfare under uniform pricing in our case are given by, respectively,
W PD =






It can be shown that WUP > W PD in the relevant area (2 ≤ nL < 6); total welfare is
higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination. The difference is, moreover,
increasing in nL, as shown in Figure 3.2. Consequently, a ban on price discrimination is
arguably beneficial both in Katz’s and our context, albeit for very different reasons. In Katz
(1987) a ban is welfare improving because a threat of investing in an outside option forces
the supplier to charge lower input prices. However, no investments actually take place
in the equilibrium Katz analyzes. In contrast, in our model at least the large firm will
make investments, but this will be in inside options that are not used per se; it invests to
press down the price of the good it actually sells in equilibrium. In this sense, investments
constitute a negative welfare effect.
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Figure 3.2: Welfare higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination (s = 1)
Consumers perceive the retailers as unrelated (s = 0)
With s = 0, there is no competition between the retailers. Clearly, also in this case each
of the local retailers invests less than the large retailer. They will therefore be charged
a higher input price and be less profitable than the large retailer (all calculations in this







;wPDS − wPDL > 0 and πPDS − πPDL < 0. (3.28)
Turning to the regime with uniform pricing, note that since there is no retail competi-
tion, the large retailer’s investment level is independent of which prices the small retailers
charge. The supplier will consequently not be able to sell to the large retailer if it charges
more than wPDL . Clearly, it does not want to charge a lower price either, so in equilibrium,
we have
wUP = wPDL = 2
16− nL
32− nL
< wPDS . (3.29)
With s = 0, price discrimination thus harms the small retailers, but has no effect on
the large retailer.
The fact that the small retailers can free-ride on investments by the large retailer,




L . It is nonetheless still true that nLπ
UP
L − πUPS > 0.
Since the small retailers pay lower input prices with uniform pricing than with price
discrimination, while the input price for the large retailer is independent of the price regime,
it immediately follows that uniform pricing harms the supplier and benefits consumers who
buy from the small retailers. More precisely, we have
uUP−uPD = −16 (16 + 15nL)
961 (nL − 32)2
(nL − 1) < 0, CSUP−CSPD =
64 (63− nL)
961 (32− nL)2
(nL − 1) > 0.
We can now state:
Proposition 5 Assume that the consumers perceive the large retailer and the small retail-
ers as unrelated (independent in demand). The supplier will price discriminate if it is able
to do so, and this will harm the consumers.
Finally, note that the loss in market power for the supplier implies that the dead-weight
loss falls. Since the small retailers moreover save investments, welfare is necessarily highest
under uniform pricing. As for s = 1, the welfare gain of uniform pricing is increasing in
nL.
Retailers are imperfect substitutes (0 < s < 1)
The analysis above indicates that the supplier prefers uniform pricing if the competitive
pressure between the stores is sufficiently strong (i.e., for sufficiently high values of s), while
the opposite is true for the consumers. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.3 (for nL =
2). If it is observed that suppliers commit to uniform pricing (e.g., price-parity clauses)
or appeal to the competition law to justify non-discrimination, policy makers should thus
be skeptical. If suppliers appear to be negative to uniform pricing, on the other hand, we
have an indication that uniform pricing would benefit the consumers. However, signals
from suppliers should be interpreted with caution, since they can clearly have incentives to
mislead policy makers.15
15According to our analyses, the arguments for allowing price discrimination is stronger if policy makers
care about consumer surplus rather than about total welfare (i.e., if they abstract from the resource costs of
higher investments in inside options). Katz (1987) focuses on the case where retailers credibly threaten to
invest in an outside option, but where the outside options will not be used in equilibrium since the supplier
responds by reducing input prices. In his framework (where it is assumed that the stores are perceived as
perfect substitutes), a ban on price discrimination is therefore welfare improving if it increases consumer
surplus.
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Figure 3.3: Consequences of price parity for the supplier and for the consumers.
3.5 Concluding remarks
We show how investments in inside options may give rise to size-based input price dis-
crimination. The important distinction between outside and inside options is whether the
investments take place before or after the supplier’s decision on input prices. This distinc-
tion may have crucial impact on suppliers’ incentives to price discriminate. In practice,
retailers may improve their position towards suppliers through investments ex ante the
negotiation with suppliers, as well as through a credible threat of switching to an outside
option ex post of the negotiations.
Let us further discuss our applications from the Introduction; the grocery market, the
book publishing market, and the multi-channel TV market. In grocery retailing, private la-
bels may constitute an alternative source of supply. For many products, retailers probably
need to make significant investments prior to negotiations over input prices with the brand
suppliers to have a credible threat from private labels. If retailers decide to backward inte-
grate and switch to a private label, they probably need to undertake further investments.
With respect to investments in private labels, there may also be significant investment
spillovers that retailers need to consider. If one retailer succeeds in introducing a private
label in one product category, this will probably make it easier for a rival retailer to do the
same.16
16Market shares of private labels differ between markets, but inside market differences among competing
retailers are smaller.
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Amazon obtains low input prices from suppliers (publishers) due to its size.17 Gilbert
(2015, page 174) argues that an important part of Amazon’s position is that they have a
credible threat to backward integrate: “Publishers have the additional concern that they
will become an antiquated and redundant component of the book industry as Amazon
increasingly deals directly with authors to supply books. Publishers fear that Amazon will
‘disintermediate’ the supply chain, replacing the traditional role of publishers to source and
distribute content.” This example illustrates that Amazon’s credible threat comes from a
combination of inside and outside options. Amazon undertakes investments into backward
integration (Amazon Publishing) which proves their ability to switch to an alternative
source of supply.
In the multi-channel TV market, a large player like Comcast, with its 23 million sub-
scribers, has a size advantage over smaller rivals, such as Google Fiber and Cablevision,
when it comes to using an alternative source of supply through backward integration into
content programming. Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016) refer to the fact that Google
Fiber emphasizes that they face a significant disadvantage due to size-based input price
discrimination in favor of larger rivals such as Comcast. This certainly indicates that trans-
actional economies of scale are needed to have a credible size advantage. In general, Google
is one of the largest firms in the world. By the same token, the buyer group of smaller cable
TV firms (the National Cable Television Cooperative) fails to achieve size-based rebates,
since they cannot coordinate backward integration on behalf of their members (Doudchenko
and Yurukoglu, 2016). Also in this example it seems reasonable that cable-TV providers
need to make investments prior to the negotiations over content input prices in order to
credibly threaten to – overnight – go to an alternative source of supply. Nonetheless, it
will involve further costs if they put their threat into action.
It is obviously a question of to which extent a supplier can commit to uniform pricing.
In our model, if the supplier cannot commit to uniform pricing, it will provide a selective
rebate to the large retailer. In several markets, we observe that firms that control wholesale
terms of trade may commit to non-discriminatory rules. In other markets, we observe that
firms are lobbying for non-discriminatory obligations, such as net-neutrality. Indeed, even
17Gilbert (2015, page 173) writes “Amazon could seek to exploit its power as a large buyer to obtain low
wholesale prices, rebates, or other concessions from its suppliers, and a credible concern is that Amazon
will continue to press its suppliers for better terms. Publishers complain that at Amazon, today’s wholesale
price is the starting point for tomorrow’s negotiations.”
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if competition authorities do not actively pursue the non-discrimination policy, one might
imagine that the supplier could appeal to the competition law to signal that it cannot price
discriminate.
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Appendix
A.1 Existence of stable equilibria
In this appendix, we show the necessary conditions for the existence of stable equilibria
where both the large and the small retailers are operative. It suffices to show this for s = 1,
since the requirement will be stricter than with any lower value of s.






where C(xi) = (γ/2)x
2
i . The stable equilibrium must satisfy the following two conditions:
1. The second-order condition: d2πi/dx
2
i < 0, and
2. Stability: |dxi/dxj| < 1.
For i = L, we have that the second-order condition d2πL/dx
2
L = −(9γ − 8nL)/9nL < 0
holds if γ ≥ 8nL
9
, and that the stability condition |dxL/dxS| = −4nL/(9γ − 8nL) < 1 is
satisfied for γ ≥ 4nL/3. The latter is the stricter requirement that ensures the existence of
stable equilibria.
Restricting our attention to the cases where nL < 6, we must have that γ ≥ 8 to ensure
stable equilibria.
A.2 Consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes (s =
1)
In this appendix, we demonstrate all calculations that are presented in section 3.4.2, where
consumers perceive the firms as perfect substitutes, s = 1. The model, including the timing
of the game, is presented in section 3.3. The game is solved by backwards induction.
Stage-three output is solved in equation (3.8). At the second stage, the supplier sets
the input prices that maximize their own profits given that the retailer will only buy the
good if wi ≤ oi. In equilibrium, this will be binding, such that zi = oi. Therefore, we insert
equation (3.1) into equation (3.8), to find the stage-two output
qi =
1− xj + 2xi
3
. (A.1)
Stage 1: Optimal investments Moving to the first stage of the model, we distinguish
between the two potential pricing regimes: input price discrimination and uniform pricing.
120
Input price discrimination At the first stage, retailer i solves ∂πi/∂xi = 0, and we


















From the optimal investment levels in (A.2) and (A.3), we then obtain the values of the
input prices (as given in section 3.4.2):
wPDL = 1− xPDL = 16
6− nL
96− 11nL




This implies that wPDS − wPDL = 696−11nL (nL − 1) > 0, which means that there is input
price discrimination in favor of the large retailer, such that the small retailer pays a higher
input price.






Once we have found the optimal investments in (A.2) and (A.3), and the input prices
in (A.4), the subsequent expressions in section 3.4.2 follow directly.
Inserting (A.2) into (3.3), we obtain the profit of the large and the small retailer,
respectively, given by the expressions in (3.22).
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) with (3.5) and (3.9), we find consumer surplus and the
supplier’s profit, respectively, as given in equation (3.23).
From equation (3.22), we find that the large retailer obtains a higher profit than the
small retailer
πPDS − πPDL = −
4 (63− 8nL)
(96− 11nL)2
(nL − 1) < 0. (A.5)
Using equation (3.22), we find that dπPDL /dnL = 100
11nL−102
(11nL−96)3





From equation (3.23), we find that dCSPD/dnL = 900
nL−11
(11nL−96)3




Total welfare is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and consumer surplus:
W PD = CSPD + uPD + πPDL + π
PD
S =
10 (1035− 226nL + 11n2L)
(96− 11nL)2
. (A.6)
Uniform pricing Suppose next that the supplier does not price discriminate, and
offers both retailers the same, uniform, input price w.
When there is no price discrimination, the supplier must give all retailers the same
take-it-or-leave-it offer. The supplier will be able to sell to both types of retailers only if
it sets w ≤ oL (i.e., the large retailer’s integration constraint binds for both retailers). In
equilibrium, we find that the input price is
w = 1− xL. (A.7)




and xUPS = 0. (A.8)
It then follows directly from (A.7) that wUP = 1−xUPL = 218−nL36−nL (equivalent to equation
3.21). Comparing this with (A.4), we see directly that wPDL < w
UP < wPDS .
We find that dwUP/dnL = − 36(nL−36)2 < 0; the large retailer invests more in the inside
option the more locations it operates in, and this forces the supplier to charge a lower price.
By inserting (A.8) into equations (3.2) and (3.3), we obtain the retailers’ profits under
uniform pricing as given by equation (3.25).
Equation (3.25) states that the small retailer receives a higher profit than the large
retailer under uniform pricing. However, the joint profit for all nL < 6 outlets is greater
than the small retailer’s profits: nLπ
UP
L − πUPS = − 4nL(nL−36)(n
2
L − 36nL + 36) > 0.
Combining (A.8) and equations (3.5) and (3.9), gives us the consumer surplus under
uniform pricing and the supplier’s profit, in equation (3.26).






Comparing (3.23) and (3.26), we find that
CSUP − CSPD = 288
(36− nL)2





uUP − uPD = − 1
(nL − 36)2




Thus, the consumers prefer price discrimination, whereas the supplier prefers uniform
pricing when consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes.
Finally, total welfare is






Comparing (A.6) and (A.9), we find that
WUP −W PD = − 1
(nL − 36)2
(52nL − 1440)
(110nL − 2260nL + 10350)
(11nL − 96) > 0.
Hence, in terms of total welfare, uniform pricing is preferred when consumers perceive
the retailers as perfect substitutes.
A.3 Consumers perceive the retailers as unrelated (s = 0)
In this appendix, we demonstrate all calculations that are presented in section 3.4.2, where
consumers perceive the firms as unrelated, s = 0. We proceed as we did in Appendix A.2,
and demonstrate all the calculations in section 3.4.2. As above, output at the third stage
is given by equation (3.8). We distinguish between the two potential pricing regimes, input
price discrimination and uniform pricing.
Input price discrimination (s = 0) We regard the case where zi = oi binds at the
second stage. Inserting equation (3.1) into equation (3.8), assuming θ = 0 and s = 0, we














By inserting (A.11) into equation (3.1), we find the optimal input prices given by
equation (3.28). The local (small) retailer is charged more than the large retailer:
wPDS − wPDL =
32
31 (32− nL)
(nL − 1) > 0. (A.12)







. This implies that πPDS − πPDL = − 431(32−nL) (nL − 1) > 0.
Combining (A.11) with (3.5) and (3.9), we obtain the consumer surplus and the profit
for the supplier, respectively:
CSPD =
64 (1985− 64nL + n2L)
961 (32− nL)2
and uPD =
16 (30 736− 1921nL + 15n2L)
961 (32− nL)2
. (A.13)
Total welfare is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and the consumer surplus:
W PD =
4
961 (nL − 32)2
(
107n2L − 11 653nL + 217 200
)
. (A.14)
Uniform pricing (s = 0) Suppose next that the supplier does not price discriminate,
and offers both retailers the same, uniform, input price w.
At stage three, the retailers choose quantities. Solving ∂πi/∂qi = 0, we find optimal





At the second stage, the input price will be determined by the large retailer’s invest-
ments, such that
w = oL = 1− xL. (A.15)




;xUPS = 0. (A.16)
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> 0. However, the joint operating profit of the large retailer exceeds the
operating profit of the small competitor, nLπ
UP
L − πUPS = − 4(nL−32)2)(n
2
L − 32nL + 32) > 0.









Comparing (A.17) and (A.13), we find that
uUP − uPD = −16 (16 + 15nL)
961 (nL − 32)2
(nL − 1) < 0
and
CSUP − CSPD = 64 (63− nL)
961 (32− nL)2
(nL − 1) > 0.
By comparing the results of price discrimination and uniform pricing, we now see that
the consumers prefer uniform pricing, whereas the supplier prefers price discrimination.
Both of these results are opposite from when consumers perceive the retailers as perfect
substitutes (s = 1).
Total welfare under uniform pricing is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and
consumer surplus:





(224− 9nL) . (A.18)
Comparing (A.14) and (A.18), we find that uniform pricing is always preferred, in terms
of total welfare, WUP −W PD = − 4
961(nL−32)2
(107n2L − 3004nL + 1936) > 0.
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A.4 Investment in marginal-cost reduction in outside options
In this appendix, we show (as promised in footnote 8) that the qualitative results of Katz
(1987) are not affected if the retailers make investments that reduce the marginal costs
rather than the fixed costs, to get access to the alternative source of supply. This reflects
our model, but where we switch the timing; investments are made after the decision on
input prices. The timing of the game is as follows (note that the order of stages one and
two is switched from our model):
• Stage 1: The supplier sets input prices wL and wS that maximize own profit, taking
into account that retailer i = L, S will buy the good only if the retailer’s profit
from buying from the supplier (no integration) exceeds the profit from backwards
integration (πNIi ≥ πIi ).
• Stage 2: The retailers decide how much to invest in the inside option (L and S
choose xL and xS, respectively). This determines oL and oS. The retailers accept
the supplier’s offer, or reject it and invest in marginal-cost reductions in the outside
option.
• Stage 3: The retailers compete à la Cournot; L and S decide qL and qS, where their
marginal costs are given by zL = min{wL, oL} and zS = min{wS, oS}, respectively.
The game is solved by backwards induction.
Stage 3: Cournot (s = 1) The basic set-up for the model, including the third stage of
the game, is given in the main text. For the purpose of this appendix, we assume θ = 0
and s = 1.
Stage-three outputs are solved in equation (3.8):
qi =
2− zj − 2zi
3
(A.19)
where zi = min{wi, oi}.
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Discriminatory pricing
Stage 2: Investments At the second stage, the retailers face two sourcing alternatives.
First, the retailers can buy the product directly from the supplier (and make no invest-
ments, i.e. no integration). Then, we set zi = wi and xi = 0 for all i. The non-integration
profit (superscript ‘NI’) becomes
πNIi =
(2 + wj − 2wi)2
9
. (A.20)
The second alternative is to acquire the product from an alternative source (integrate
backwards), such that zi = oi = 1 − xi. Then, the integration profit (superscript ‘I’)
becomes
πIi =






















Inserting the optimal investments into equation (A.21) yields the integration profit for








Stage 1: Supplier chooses input prices At the first stage, the supplier chooses input
prices. The supplier maximizes profits, such that the retailers are indifferent between
buying from the supplier, and acquiring the product elsewhere. It follows that (A.20) must
equal (A.22), and we solve for wi and find the best-response functions (in Katz’s words:
the integration frontier):
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From the best-response functions, we find that the integration frontier is upward sloping
(∂wL(wS)/∂wS = 1/2 > 0), similar to Katz (1987).
We solve the two best-response functions simultaneously, and find optimal input prices











S), and we have input price discrimination in
favor of the large retailer. In equilibrium, the retailers will not make any investments, such
that xi = 0 for all i = L, S. Inserting (A.23) into (A.20), retailer profits from buying from
the supplier (no integration) are πPDL = 100
9−nL
(11nL−96)2




Uniform pricing (zi = w)
Stage 2: Optimal investments Suppose now that the supplier only offers one uniform
price to the retailers, such that zi = w. Again, the retailer has two sourcing alternatives.
It can buy from the supplier, for which zi = w and xi = 0 for all i. Then, non-integration





Alternatively, it can integrate backwards into supply and use an outside option, in which
case zi = oi = 1−xL. This means that the input price is determined by the large retailer’s







Taking the derivative of equation (A.25) with respect to investments xi, ∂πi/∂xi = 0,
yields the optimal investment levels xUPL =
nL
36−nL
and xUPS = 0. We observe that x
UP
L <










Stage 1: Supplier chooses input prices At the first stage, the supplier chooses in-
put prices, such that the retailers are indifferent between buying from the supplier, and
acquiring the product elsewhere. It follows that (A.24) must equal (A.26), and solve for a
common wUP :










. Thus, the supplier
offers a uniform input price to all retailers that is lower than the average prices charged
under price discrimination. This corresponds to Katz’s Lemmas 1 and A.1. Hence, the
qualitative results of Katz (1987) are the same whether we consider fixed-cost investments
or marginal-cost reducing investments.
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